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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
14-981 
Ruling Below: Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. Tex. 2014) 
On July 15, 2014, in its second ruling on the case, a three-judge panel from the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rendered a 2-1 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, holding that 
the consideration of race or ethnicity by the University of Texas at Austin's (UT) in its admission 
program was narrowly tailored to achieve UT’s compelling educational interests and, therefore, 
justified under applicable constitutional standards. The Fifth Circuit reheard the case after the 
U.S. Supreme Court determined in June 2013 that the Fifth Circuit, in its first ruling, had not 
subjected the university’s consideration of race to the required "strict judicial scrutiny" that 
applies whenever race conscious policies are challenged. 
Question Presented: Whether the Fifth Circuit's re-endorsement of the University of Texas at 
Austin's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under 
this Court's decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
including Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 
Abigail Noel FISHER 
Plaintiff –Appellant 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN; DAVID B. PRYOR, Executive Vice Chancellor 
for Academic Affairs in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM POWERS, JR., President of the 
University of Texas at Austin in His Official Capacity; BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM; R. STEVEN HICKS, as Member of the Board of 
Regents in His Official Capacity; WILLIAM EUGENE POWELL, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES R. HUFFINES, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JANIECE LONGORIA, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; COLLEEN MCHUGH, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in Her Official Capacity; ROBERT L. STILLWELL, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; JAMES D. DANNENBAUM, as Member of the 
Board of Regents in His Official Capacity; PAUL FOSTER, as Member of the Board of 
Regents in His Official Capacity; PRINTICE L. GARY, as Member of the Board of 
Regents in His Official Capacity; KEDRA ISHOP, Vice Provost and Director of 
Undergraduate Admissions in Her Official Capacity; FRANCISCO G. CIGARROA, M.D., 
Interim Chancellor of the University of Texas System in His Official Capacity, 
Defendant – Appellees 
 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
 
Decided on July 15, 2014 
 187 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit 
Judge: 
 
Abigail Fisher brought this action against the 
University of Texas at Austin, alleging that 
the University’s race-conscious admissions 
program violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The district court granted 
summary judgment to UT Austin and we 
affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded, holding that this Court and the 
district court reviewed UT Austin’s means to 
the end of a diverse student body with undue 
deference; that we must give a more exacting 
scrutiny to UT Austin’s efforts to achieve 
diversity. With the benefit of additional 
briefing, oral argument, and the ordered 
exacting scrutiny, we affirm the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 
I 
A 
 
Fisher applied to UT Austin for admission to 
the entering class of fall 2008. Although a 
Texas resident, she did not graduate in the top 
ten percent of her class. She therefore did not 
qualify for automatic admission under the 
Top Ten Percent Plan, which that year took 
81% of the seats available for Texas 
residents. Instead, she was considered under 
the holistic review program, which looks past 
class rank to evaluate each applicant as an 
individual based on his or her achievements 
and experiences, and so became one of 
17,131 applicants for the remaining 1,216 
seats for Texas residents. 
 
UT Austin denied Fisher admission. Kedra B. 
Ishop, the Associate Director of Admissions 
at the time of Fisher’s application, explained 
that “[g]iven the lack of space available in the 
fall freshman class due to the Top 10% Plan, 
. . . based on [her] high school class rank and 
test scores,” Fisher could not “have gained 
admission through the fall review process.” 
As Ishop explained, any applicant who was 
not offered admission either through the Top 
Ten Percent Law or through an exceptionally 
high Academic Index (“AI”) score is 
evaluated through the holistic review 
process. The AI is calculated based on an 
applicant’s standardized test scores, class 
rank, and high school coursework. Holistic 
review considers applicants’ AI scores and 
Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”) scores. 
The PAI is calculated from (i) the weighted 
average score received for each of two 
required essays and (ii) a personal 
achievement score based on a holistic review 
of the entire application, with slightly more 
weight being placed on the latter. In 
calculating the personal achievement score, 
the staff member conducts a holistic review 
of the contents of the applicant’s entire file, 
including demonstrated leadership qualities, 
extracurricular activities, honors and awards, 
essays, work experience, community service, 
and special circumstances, such as the 
applicant’s socioeconomic status, family 
composition, special family responsibilities, 
the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s 
high school, and race. No numerical value is 
ever assigned to any of the components of 
personal achievement scores, and because 
race is a factor considered in the unique 
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context of each applicant’s entire experience, 
it may be a beneficial factor for a minority or 
a non-minority student. 
To admit applicants through this holistic 
review, the admissions office generates an 
initial AI/PAI matrix for each academic 
program, wherein applicants are placed into 
groups that share the same combination of AI 
and PAI scores. School liaisons then draw 
stair-step lines along this matrix, selecting 
groups of students on the basis of their 
combined AI and PAI scores. This process is 
repeated until each program admits a 
sufficient number of students. 
 
Fisher’s AI scores were too low for 
admission to her preferred academic 
programs at UT Austin; Fisher had a Liberal 
Arts AI of 3.1 and a Business AI of 3.1.15 
And, because nearly all the seats in the 
undeclared major program in Liberal Arts 
were filled with Top Ten Percent students, all 
holistic review applicants “were only eligible 
for Summer Freshman Class or CAP 
[Coordinated Admissions Program] 
admission, unless their AI exceeded 3.5.” 
16 Accordingly, even if she had received a 
perfect PAI score of 6, she could not have 
received an offer of admission to the Fall 
2008 freshman class.17 If she had been a 
minority the result would have been the 
same. 
 
B 
 
This reality together with factual 
developments since summary judgment call 
into question whether Fisher has standing. 
UT Austin argues that Fisher lacks standing 
because (i) she graduated from another 
university in May 2012, thus rendering her 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief 
moot, and (ii) there is no causal relationship 
between any use of race in the decision to 
deny Fisher admission and the $100 
application fee—a non-refundable expense 
faced by all applicants that puts at issue 
whether Fisher suffered monetary injury. 
 
Two competing and axiomatic principles 
govern the resolution of this question. First, 
jurisdiction must exist at every stage of 
litigation. A litigant “generally may raise a 
court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at 
any time in the same civil action, even 
initially at the highest appellate instance.” 
Even if “defendants failed to challenge 
jurisdiction at a prior stage of the litigation, 
they are not prohibited from raising it later.” 
Indeed, the “independent establishment of 
subject-matter jurisdiction is so important 
that [even] a party ostensibly invoking 
federal jurisdiction may later challenge it as a 
means of avoiding adverse results on the 
merits.” 
 
Second, the “mandate rule,” a corollary of the 
law of the case doctrine, “compels 
compliance on remand with the dictates of a 
superior court and forecloses relitigation of 
issues expressly or impliedly decided by the 
appellate court.” The Supreme Court, like all 
Article III courts, had its own independent 
obligation to confirm jurisdiction, and where 
the lower federal court “lack[ed] jurisdiction, 
[the Supreme Court has] jurisdiction on 
appeal, not of the merits, but merely for the 
purpose of correcting the error of the lower 
court in entertaining the suit.” 
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UT Austin’s standing arguments carry force, 
but in our view the actions of the Supreme 
Court do not allow our reconsideration. The 
Supreme Court did not address the issue of 
standing, although it was squarely presented 
to it. Rather, it remanded the case for a 
decision on the merits, having reaffirmed 
Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in 
Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke as read by the Court in Grutter v. 
Bollinger. It affirmed all of this Court’s 
decision except its application of strict 
scrutiny. The parties have identified no 
changes in jurisdictional facts occurring since 
briefing in the Supreme Court. Fisher’s 
standing is limited to challenging the injury 
she alleges she suffered—the use of race in 
UT Austin’s admissions program for the 
entering freshman class of Fall 2008. 
 
II 
 
We turn to the question whether we can and 
should remand this case. The Supreme 
Court’s mandate frames its resolution, 
ordering that “[t]he judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated, and the case remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.” The mandate must be read against 
the backdrop of custom that accords courts of 
appeal discretion to remand to the district 
court on receipt of remands to it for 
proceedings consistent with the opinion—a 
customary discretion not displaced but 
characterized by nigh boiler plate variations 
in phrasing of instructions such as “on 
remand the Court of Appeals may 
‘consider,’” or “for the Court of Appeals to 
consider in the first instance.” 
 
A 
 
Fisher argues that the Supreme Court’s 
remanding language—“fairness to the 
litigants and the courts that heard the case 
requires that it be remanded so that the 
admissions process can be considered and 
judged under a correct analysis”31—compels 
the conclusion that “fairness” must be 
achieved by having this Court, and not the 
district court, conduct the inquiry. Fisher 
relies on the Supreme Court’s statement that 
“the Court of Appeals must assess whether 
the University has offered sufficient evidence 
that its admissions program is narrowly 
tailored to obtain the educational benefits of 
diversity.” And Fisher argues that at 
summary judgment, all parties conceded that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact 
to be resolved and that the case should be 
decided on summary judgment. 
 
UT Austin opposes this parsing of language, 
arguing that Fisher fails to credit (i) the 
entirety of the Supreme Court’s references 
which spoke, not just to the fairness of 
allowing this Court to correct its error, but 
also to the fairness to the district court, which 
first heard the case and was faulted for the 
same error as this Court; and, (ii) that the 
language used by the Supreme Court is the 
common language of remand orders and is 
often followed by a remand to the district 
court. UT Austin notes that in its remanding 
language, the Supreme Court cites Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, where the court of 
appeals remanded to the district court after 
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of 
the court of appeals for failure to apply strict 
scrutiny. Finally, UT Austin argues that the 
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remand language, at best, is ambiguous and, 
given the custom of the courts of appeals, 
should not be read to foreclose the clear 
discretion of this Court to remand absent 
specific, contrary instructions from the 
Supreme Court. 
 
Given the customary practice of the courts of 
appeals and the less than clear language of the 
Supreme Court’s remand, we are not 
persuaded that the Supreme Court intended to 
foreclose our discretion to remand to the 
district court. A review of the Supreme 
Court’s language lends but little support to 
each side. Yet, this is telling. Had the 
Supreme Court intended to control the 
discretion of this Court as to whether the 
district court should first address an error that 
the Supreme Court found was made by both 
courts, there would have been no uncertainty 
in the remand language. The question 
whether we should remand remains. 
 
B 
 
There is no clear benefit to remanding this 
case to the district court. The suggestion, 
without more, that discovery may be 
necessary given the Supreme Court’s holding 
regarding proper scrutiny and deference adds 
nothing. Admittedly, this case differs from 
Grutter, in that Grutter went to trial. And 
evidence offered by live witnesses is far more 
likely to surface and resolve fact issues than 
summary judgment evidence crafted by 
advocates. But that too is far from certain. 
Indeed, UT Austin’s argument goes no 
further than “factual questions or disputes 
may arise on remand.” Notably, UT Austin 
does not argue that a trial will be necessary. 
Rather its principal target on remand is 
standing, with questions that continue to 
haunt, but are foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court’s implicit finding of standing, 
questions only it can now address. 
 
We find that there are no new issues of fact 
that need be resolved, nor is there any 
identified need for additional discovery; that 
the record is sufficiently developed; and that 
the found error is common to both this Court 
and the district court. It follows that a remand 
would likely result in duplication of effort. 
We deny UT Austin’s motion for remand, 
and turn to the merits. 
 
III 
A 
 
In remanding, the Supreme Court held that its 
decision in Grutter requires that “strict 
scrutiny must be applied to any admissions 
program using racial categories or 
classifications”; that “racial classifications 
are constitutional only if they are narrowly 
tailored to further compelling governmental 
interests.” Bringing forward Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter, the Supreme 
Court faulted the district court’s and this 
Court’s review of UT Austin’s means to 
achieve the permissible goal of diversity—
whether UT Austin’s efforts were narrowly 
tailored to achieve the end of a diverse 
student body. Our charge is to give exacting 
scrutiny to these efforts. 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that “a 
university’s educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational 
mission is one to which we defer.” The 
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“decision to pursue the educational benefits 
that flow from student body diversity that the 
University deems integral to its mission is, in 
substantial measure, an academic judgment 
to which some, but not complete, judicial 
deference is proper under Grutter.” 
Accordingly, a court “should ensure that 
there is a reasoned, principled explanation for 
the academic decision.” 
 
In both Fisher and Grutter, the Supreme 
Court endorsed Justice Powell’s conclusion 
that “attainment of a diverse student body . . 
. is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institution of higher education;”40 that in 
contrast to “[r]edressing past discrimination, 
. . . [t]he attainment of a diverse student body 
. . . serves values beyond race alone, 
including enhanced classroom dialogue and 
the lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes”; that the “academic mission of a 
university is a special concern of the First 
Amendment . . . [and part] of the business of 
a university [is] to provide that atmosphere 
which is most conducive to speculation, 
experiment, and creation, and this in turn 
leads to the question of who may be admitted 
to study.” It signifies that this compelling 
interest in “securing diversity’s benefits . . . 
is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in 
which a specified percentage of the student 
body is in effect guaranteed to be members of 
selected ethnic groups, with the remaining 
percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of 
students.” Rather, “diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far 
broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important 
element.” Justice Powell found Harvard’s 
admissions program to be particularly 
commendable. There an applicant’s race was 
but one form of diversity that would be 
weighed against qualities such as 
“exceptional personal talents, unique work or 
service experience, leadership potential, 
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history 
of overcoming disadvantage, ability to 
communicate with the poor, or other 
qualifications deemed important.” Bakke 
envisions a rich pluralism for American 
institutions of higher education, one at odds 
with a one-size-fits-all conception of 
diversity, indexed to the ways in which a 
diverse student body contributes to a 
university’s distinct educational mission, not 
numerical measures. 
 
Diversity is a composite of the backgrounds, 
experiences, achievements, and hardships of 
students to which race only contributes. “[A] 
university is not permitted to define diversity 
as some specified percentage of a particular 
group merely because of its race or ethnic 
origin” because that “would amount to 
outright racial balancing, which is patently 
unconstitutional.” Instead, Grutter approved 
the University of Michigan Law School’s 
goal of “attaining a critical mass of under-
represented minority students,” and noted 
that such a goal “does not transform its 
program into a quota.” 
 
B 
 
In language from which it has not retreated, 
the Supreme Court explained that the 
educational goal of diversity must be 
“defined by reference to the educational 
benefits that diversity is designed to 
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produce.” Recognizing that universities do 
more than download facts from professors to 
students, the Supreme Court recognized three 
distinct educational objectives served by 
diversity: (i) increased perspectives, meaning 
that diverse perspectives improve 
educational quality by making classroom 
discussion “livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening and interesting 
when the students have the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds”; (ii) professionalism, 
meaning that “student body diversity . . . 
better prepares [students] as professionals,” 
because the skills students need for the 
“increasingly global marketplace can only be 
developed through exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints”; and, (iii) civic engagement, 
meaning that a diverse student body is 
necessary for fostering “[e]ffective 
participation by members of all racial and 
ethnic groups in the civil life of our Nation[, 
which] is essential if the dream of one Nation, 
indivisible, is to be realized.” All this the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed, leaving for this 
Court a “further judicial determination that 
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny 
in its implementation”; that is, its means of 
achieving the goal of diversity are narrowly 
tailored. 
 
A university “must prove that the means 
chosen by the University to attain diversity 
are narrowly tailored to that goal.” And a 
university “receives no deference” on this 
point because it is the courts that must ensure 
that the “means chosen to accomplish the 
[university’s] asserted purpose . . . be 
specifically and narrowly framed to 
accomplish that purpose.” Although “a court 
can take account of a university’s experience 
and expertise in adopting or rejecting certain 
admissions processes,” it remains a 
university’s burden to demonstrate and the 
court’s obligation to determine whether the 
“admissions processes ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual, and 
not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her 
application.” 
 
C 
 
Narrow tailoring requires that the court 
“verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a university 
to use race to achieve the educational benefits 
of diversity.” Such a verification requires a 
“careful judicial inquiry into whether a 
university could achieve sufficient diversity 
without using racial classifications.” Thus, 
the reviewing court must “ultimately be 
satisfied that no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational 
benefits of diversity.” It follows, therefore, 
that if “a nonracial approach . . . could 
promote the substantial interest about as well 
and at tolerable expenses, . . . then the 
university may not consider race.” And it is 
the university that bears “the ultimate burden 
of demonstrating, before turning to racial 
classifications, that available, workable race-
neutral alternatives do not suffice.” 
 
The Supreme Court emphasized that strict 
scrutiny must be balanced. That is, “[s]trict 
scrutiny must not be strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact,” yet it must also “not be strict in 
theory but feeble in fact.” 
 
IV 
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A 
 
Fisher insists that our inquiry into narrow 
tailoring begin in 2004, the last year before 
UT Austin adopted its current race-conscious 
admissions program. Looking to that year, 
Fisher argues that the Top Ten Percent Plan 
had achieved a substantial combined 
Hispanic and African-American enrollment 
of approximately 21.5%;64 and that this is 
more minority enrollment than present in 
Grutter, where a race-conscious plan grew 
minority enrollment from approximately 4% 
to 14%. Because UT Austin was already 
enrolling a larger percentage of minorities 
than the Michigan Law School, the argument 
maintains, UT Austin had achieved sufficient 
diversity to attain the educational benefits of 
diversity, a critical mass, before it adopted a 
race-conscious admissions policy; that even 
if sufficient diversity had not been achieved 
by 2004, it had been achieved by 2007 when 
the combined percentage of Hispanic and 
African-American enrolled students was 
25.5%. Thus, Fisher argues, the race-
conscious admissions policy had a de 
minimis effect, at most adding 0.92% 
African-American enrollment and 2.5% 
Hispanic enrollment; that a slight 
contribution is not a “constitutionally 
meaningful” impact on student body 
diversity and is no more than an exercise in 
gratuitous racial engineering. 
 
This effort to truncate the inquiry clings to a 
baseline that crops events Fisher’s claim 
ignores, as it must. The true narrative 
presents with a completeness both fair and 
compelled by the Supreme Court’s charge to 
ascertain the facts in full without deference, 
exposing the de minimis argument as an 
effort to turn narrow tailoring upside down. 
We turn to that narrative. 
 
B 
 
In 1997, following the Hopwood v. Texas 
decision, UT Austin faced a nearly 
intractable problem: achieving diversity—
including racial diversity—essential to its 
educational mission, while not facially 
considering race even as one of many 
components of that diversity. Forbidden any 
use of race after Hopwood, UT Austin turned 
to the Top Ten Percent Plan, which 
guarantees Texas residents graduating in the 
top ten percent of their high school class 
admission to any public university in Texas. 
Such a mechanical admissions program could 
have filled every freshman seat but standing 
alone it was not a workable means of 
achieving the diversity envisioned by Bakke, 
bypassing as it did high-performing multi-
talented students, minority and non-minority. 
 
With its blindness to all but the single 
dimension of class rank, the Top Ten Percent 
Plan came with significant costs to diversity 
and academic integrity, passing over large 
numbers of highly qualified minority and 
non-minority applicants. The difficulties of 
Texas’s and other states’ percentage plans 
did not escape the Court in Grutter, which 
explained that “even assuming such plans are 
race-neutral, they may preclude the 
university from conducting the 
individualized assessments necessary to 
assemble a student body that is not just 
racially diverse, but diverse along all the 
qualities valued by the university.” 
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Nor did these difficulties escape the Texas 
legislature. Opponents to the proposed plan 
noted that such a policy “could actually harm 
institutions” and “would not solve the 
problems created by [Hopwood].” So the 
legislature adopted a Top Ten Percent Plan 
that left a substantial number of seats to a 
complementary holistic review process. 
Foreshadowing Grutter, admission 
supplementing the Top Ten Percent Plan 
included factors such as socio-economic 
diversity and family educational 
achievements but, controlled by Hopwood, it 
did not include race. In short, a holistic 
process sans race controlled the gate for the 
large percent of applicants not entering 
through the Top Ten Percent Plan. Over the 
succeeding years the Top Ten Percent Plan 
took an increasing number of seats, a take 
inherent in its structure and a centerpiece of 
narrow tailoring, as we will explain. 
 
C 
 
We are offered no coherent response to the 
validity of a potentially different election by 
UT Austin: to invert the process and use 
Grutter’s holistic review to select 80% or all 
of its students. Such an exponential increase 
in the use of race under the flag of narrow 
tailoring is perverse. Grutter blessed an 
admissions program, applied to the entire 
pool of students competing for admission, 
which “considers race as one factor among 
many, in an effort to assemble a student body 
that is diverse in ways broader than race.” 
Affording no deference, we look for narrow 
tailoring in UT’s Austin’s use of this 
individualized race-conscious holistic 
review, applied as it is only to a small fraction 
of the student body as the rest is consumed by 
race-neutral efforts. 
 
Close scrutiny of the data in this record 
confirms that holistic review—what little 
remains after over 80% of the class is 
admitted on class rank alone—does not, as 
claimed, function as an open gate to boost 
minority headcount for a racial quota. Far 
from it. The increasingly fierce competition 
for the decreasing number of seats available 
for Texas students outside the top ten percent 
results in minority students being under-
represented—and white students being over-
represented—in holistic review admissions 
relative to the program’s impact on each 
incoming class. In other words, for each year 
since the Top Ten Percent Plan was created 
through 2008, holistic review contributed a 
greater percentage of the incoming class of 
Texans as a whole than it did the incoming 
minority students. Examples illustrate this 
effect. Of the incoming class of 2008, the 
year Fisher applied for admission, holistic 
review contributed 19% of the class of Texas 
students as a whole—but only 12% of the 
Hispanic students and 16% of the black 
students, while contributing 24% of the white 
students.68 The incoming class of 2005, the 
year that the Grutter plan was first 
introduced, is similar. That year, 31% of the 
class of Texas students as a whole was 
admitted through holistic review (with the 
remaining 69% of incoming seats for Texans 
filled by the Top Ten Percent Plan)—but only 
21% of the Hispanic Texan students in the 
incoming class were admitted through 
holistic review, and 26% of the incoming 
black Texan students, but 35% of the 
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incoming white Texan students. Minorities 
being under-represented in holistic review 
admission relative to the impact of holistic 
review on the class as a whole holds true 
almost without exception for both blacks and 
Hispanics for every year from 1996–2008. 
 
Given the test score gaps between minority 
and non-minority applicants, if holistic 
review was not designed to evaluate each 
individual’s contributions to UT Austin’s 
diversity, including those that stem from 
race, holistic admissions would approach an 
all-white enterprise. Data for the entering 
Texan class of 2005, the first year of the 
Grutter plan, show that Hispanic students 
admitted through holistic review attained an 
average SAT score of 1193, African-
American students an 1118, and white 
students a 1295. For the entering class of 
2007, the last class before Fisher applied for 
admission, the corresponding data were 1155 
for Hispanic students, 1073 for African 
American students, and 1275 for white 
students, this from a universe of 
underperforming secondary schools. As we 
have explained, the impact of the holistic 
review program on minority admissions is 
already narrow, targeting students of all races 
that meet both the competitive academic bar 
of admissions and have unique qualities that 
complement the contributions of Top Ten 
Percent Plan admittees. 
 
D 
 
UT Austin did not stop with the Top Ten 
Percent Plan in its effort to exhaust racially 
neutral alternatives to achieving diversity. It 
also initiated a number of outreach and 
scholarship efforts targeting under-
represented demographics, including the over 
half of Texas high school graduates that are 
African-American or Hispanic. Programs 
included the Longhorn Opportunity 
Scholarship Program, the Presidential 
Achievement Scholarship Program, the First 
Generation Scholarship, and increased 
outreach efforts. Implemented in 1997, the 
Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Program 
offers scholarships to graduates of certain 
high schools throughout Texas that had 
predominantly low-income student 
populations and a history of few, if any, UT 
Austin matriculates. It guarantees a specific 
number of scholarships for applicants who 
attend these schools, graduate within the top 
ten percent, and attend UT Austin. The 
Presidential Achievement Scholarship 
program is a need-based scholarship that is 
awarded based on the applicant’s family 
income, high school characteristics, and 
academic performance as compared to his or 
her peers at that high school. The First 
Generation Scholarship Program targets 
applicants who are the first in their family to 
attend college. UT Austin invested 
substantial amounts of money in these 
scholarship programs. Between 1997 and 
2007, UT Austin awarded $59 million 
through these scholarships.77 Indeed, in 
2007, UT Austin awarded $5.8 million for the 
Longhorn Opportunity and Presidential 
Achievement scholarship programs alone. 
 
UT Austin also expanded its outreach and 
recruitment efforts by increasing its 
recruitment budget by $500,000, by adding 
three regional admissions centers in Dallas, 
San Antonio, and Harlingen,79 by engaging 
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in outreach programs that brought 
prospective students to UT Austin for day-
long or overnight visits, and by hosting multi-
day campus conferences for high school 
counselors. These regional admissions 
centers reflect a substantial investment by UT 
Austin: the Dallas Admissions center 
employed 4 new full-time staff, the San 
Antonio Admissions Center employed 4 new 
full-time staff, and the Harlingen Admissions 
Center employed 5 new full-time staff. The 
stated goal of these centers was “to increase 
[UT Austin’s] visibility and interaction with 
prospective students, parents and high school 
administrators within the geographic market 
they existed [sic]. These centers allowed for 
increased quality and quantity of counseling, 
face to face discussions, and programming 
within the prospective students’ home city.” 
Additionally, staff from these regional 
centers helped organize “over 1,000 College 
Night/Day events held at High Schools 
across the state” and “around 1,000 Day 
Visits to High Schools around the state in an 
effort to encourage prospective top 10% 
students to apply and enroll at [UT Austin].” 
Relatedly, the admissions office also held 
targeted recruiting events for students from 
the Dallas, San Antonio, Houston, and Rio 
Grande Valley areas. These events included 
the “Longhorn Lock-in,” wherein students 
from targeted high schools would spend the 
night at UT Austin; the UT Scholars 
Program, wherein scholarship recipients 
from targeted schools would spend the night 
at UT Austin; and “Longhorn for a Day,” 
wherein students from targeted schools 
would spend the day at UT Austin. Finally, 
the admissions office would hold four 
“Longhorn Saturday Events” on campus, 
where thousands of prospective students and 
their families would come to UT Austin. 
 
In addition to the admissions office’s efforts, 
UT Austin’s Office of Student Financial 
Services increased their outreach efforts by 
putting together the Financial Aid Outreach 
Group to visit high schools to help 
prospective students “understand the 
financial support offered by [UT Austin].” 
The goal of this Financial Aid Outreach 
Group “was to convince low income students 
that money should not be a barrier to 
attending college.” 
 
“Narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every race neutral alternative,” 
but rather “serious, good faith consideration 
of workable race-neutral alternatives that will 
achieve the diversity the university seeks.” 
Put simply, this record shows that UT Austin 
implemented every race-neutral effort that its 
detractors now insist must be exhausted prior 
to adopting a race-conscious admissions 
program—in addition to an automatic 
admissions plan not required under Grutter 
that admits over 80% of the student body with 
no facial use of race at all. 
 
E 
 
Despite UT Austin’s rapid adoption of these 
race-neutral efforts, in 1997—the first 
freshman class after Hopwood—the 
percentage of African-American admitted 
students fell from 4.37% to 3.41%, 
representing a drop from 501 to 419 students 
even as the total number of admitted students 
increased by 833 students.90 Similarly, the 
percentage of Hispanic admitted students fell 
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from 15.37% to 12.95%. With UT Austin’s 
facially race-neutral admissions program and 
outreach efforts, the percentage of African-
American and Hispanic admitted students 
eventually recovered to pre-Hopwood levels. 
By 2004, African-American admitted 
students climbed to 4.82% and Hispanic 
admitted students climbed to 16.21%. But 
minority representation then remained 
largely stagnant, within a narrow oscillating 
band, rather than moving towards a critical 
mass of minority students. The hard data 
show that starting in 1998 and moving toward 
2004, African-American students comprised 
3.34%, then 4.32%, then 4.24%, then 3.49%, 
then 3.67%, then 3.89%, and finally 4.82% of 
the admitted pool. Similarly, Hispanic 
admitted students represented 13.53%, then 
14.27%, then 13.75%, then 14.25%, then 
14.43%, then 15.60%, and finally 16.21% of 
the entering classes for those respective 
years. 
 
V 
A 
 
Numbers aside, the Top Ten Percent Plan’s 
dependence upon a distinct admissions door 
remained apparent. With each entering class, 
there was a gap between the lower 
standardized test scores of students admitted 
under the Top Ten Percent Plan and the 
higher scores of those admitted under holistic 
review. For example, in 2008—the year 
Fisher applied for admission—81% of the 
seats available to Texas residents were taken 
up by the Top Ten Percent Plan. These Top 
Ten Percent students had an average 
standardized test score of 1219, 66 points 
lower than the average standardized test 
score of 1285 attained by Texas students 
admitted under holistic review or on the basis 
of a high AI. A gap persisted not only among 
students overall and white students, but also 
among racial and ethnic minority students. 
This inheres in the reality that the strength of 
the Top Ten Percent Plan is also its weakness, 
one that with its single dimension of selection 
makes it unworkable standing alone. 
 
B 
 
The sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan 
gains diversity from a fundamental weakness 
in the Texas secondary education system. 
The de facto segregation of schools in Texas 
enables the Top Ten Percent Plan to increase 
minorities in the mix, while ignoring 
contributions to diversity beyond race. We 
assume, as none here contends otherwise, 
that this “segregation [is] not the ‘product . . 
. of state action but of private choices,’ 
having no ‘constitutional implications’” and 
therefore it is “a question for the political 
branches to decide[] the manner—which is to 
say the process—of its resolution.” In short, 
these demographics are directly relevant to 
the choices made by the political branches of 
Texas as they acted against the backdrop of 
this unchallenged reality in their effort to 
achieve a diverse student body. Texas is here 
an active lab of experimentation embraced by 
the Court in Schuette v. BAMN. We reference 
here these unchallenged facts of 
resegregation not in justification of a racial 
remedy, but because the racial makeup and 
relative performance of Texas high schools 
bear on the workability of an alternative to 
any use of race for 80% of student admissions 
to UT Austin. The political branches opted 
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for this facially race-neutral alternative—a 
narrow tailoring in implementation of their 
goal of diversity. 
 
Fisher’s claim can proceed only if Texas 
must accept this weakness of the Top Ten 
Percent Plan and live with its inability to look 
beyond class rank and focus upon 
individuals. Perversely, to do so would put in 
place a quota system pretextually race 
neutral. While the Top Ten Percent Plan 
boosts minority enrollment by skimming 
from the tops of Texas high schools, it does 
so against this backdrop of increasing 
resegregation in Texas public schools, where 
over half of Hispanic students and 40% of 
black students attend a school with 90%–
100% minority enrollment. 
 
Data for the year Fisher graduated high 
school show that gaps between the quality of 
education available to students at integrated 
high schools and at majority-minority 
schools are stark. Their impact upon UT 
Austin is direct. The Top Ten Percent Plan 
draws heavily from the population 
concentrations of the three major 
metropolitan areas of Texas—San Antonio, 
Houston, and Dallas/Fort Worth—where 
over half of Texas residents live and where 
the outcomes gaps of segregated urban 
schools are most pronounced. The San 
Antonio metropolitan area demonstrates this 
effect. Boerne Independent School District 
(“ISD”) achieved a “recognized status” and 
five “Gold Performance Acknowledgments” 
from the Texas Education Agency. At this 
relatively integrated school district, 79.9% of 
graduating students were white and 19.2% 
were black or Hispanic. Over 97% of 
students graduated high school. They 
achieved an average SAT score of 1072, and 
61% were deemed college-ready in both 
English and Math by the Texas Education 
Agency. San Antonio ISD, its neighbor, a 
highly segregated and “academically 
unacceptable” district, tells a different story. 
86.8% of graduating students were Hispanic 
and 8.2% were black, and over 90% were 
economically disadvantaged. Only 59.1% of 
the high school class of 2008 graduated; SAT 
test takers achieved an average score of 811; 
and only 28% of graduates were college-
ready in both English and Math. 
 
A similar tale of two cities played out in the 
Houston area between integrated Katy ISD, 
where 7.8% of graduating students were 
black, 23.2% Hispanic, and 59.8% white, and 
segregated Pasadena ISD, where 6.5% were 
black, 64.8% Hispanic, and 24.3% white. At 
Katy, a “recognized” district with two “Gold 
Performance Acknowledgments,” 91.8% of 
students graduated, with an average SAT 
score of 1080 and 60% college readiness in 
both English and Math. At Pasadena, only 
67.8% graduated; SAT test-takers achieved 
an average score of 928; and 40% were 
college-ready in both English and Math. 
 
The narrative repeats itself in the Dallas/Fort 
Worth metropolitan area. For example, 
Keller ISD, a large and “recognized” school 
district with four “Gold Performance 
Acknowledgements,” is fairly integrated. 
72.3% of graduating students are white, 
12.2% are Hispanic, and 7.3% are African-
American. The high school senior class of 
2008 attained a graduation rate of 88.7% and 
an average SAT score of 1043, and 53% were 
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college-ready in both English and Math. The 
data for nearby Dallas ISD, one of the largest 
in the state with 157,174 students and 7,308 
high school seniors, shows a highly 
segregated school in stark contrast. There, 
black and Hispanic students make up 90.9% 
of the graduating class, and 86.1% of all 
students are economically disadvantaged. 
Only 65.2% graduated high school; SAT test-
takers achieved an average score of 856; and 
only 29% of graduating seniors were college-
ready in both English and Math. 
 
The top decile of high schools in each of 
these districts—including large numbers of 
students from highly segregated, 
underfunded, and underperforming 
schools—all qualified for automatic 
admission to UT Austin. That these students 
were able to excel in the face of severe 
limitations in their high school education and 
earn a coveted place in UT Austin’s 
prestigious freshman class is to be 
commended. That other students are left 
out—those who fell outside their high 
school’s top ten percent but excelled in 
unique ways that would enrich the diversity 
of UT Austin’s educational experience—
leaves a gap in an admissions process seeking 
to create the multi-dimensional diversity that 
Bakke envisions. 
 
C 
 
UT Austin’s holistic review program—a 
program nearly indistinguishable from the 
University of Michigan Law School’s 
program in Grutter—was a necessary and 
enabling component of the Top Ten Percent 
Plan by allowing UT Austin to reach a pool 
of minority and non-minority students with 
records of personal achievement, higher 
average test scores, or other unique skills. A 
variety of perspectives, that is differences in 
life experiences, is a distinct and valued 
element of diversity. Yet a significant 
number of students excelling in high-
performing schools are passed over by the 
Top Ten Percent Plan although they could 
bring a perspective not captured by 
admissions along the sole dimension of class 
rank. For example, the experience of being a 
minority in a majority-white or majority-
minority school and succeeding in that 
environment offers a rich pool of potential 
UT Austin students with demonstrated 
qualities of leadership and sense of self. 
Efforts to draw from this pool do not demean 
the potential of Top Ten admittees. Rather it 
complements their contribution to 
diversity—mitigating in an important way 
the effects of the single dimension process. 
 
UT Austin persuades that this reach into the 
applicant pool is not a further search for 
numbers but a search for students of unique 
talents and backgrounds who can enrich the 
diversity of the student body in distinct ways 
including test scores, predicting higher levels 
of preparation and better prospects for 
admission to UT Austin’s more demanding 
colleges and ultimately graduation. It also 
signifies that this is a draw from a highly 
competitive pool, a mix of minority and non-
minority students who would otherwise be 
absent from a Top Ten Percent pool selected 
on class rank, a relative and not an 
independent measure across the pool of 
applicants. 
 
 200 
VI 
 
These realities highlight the difficulty of an 
approach that seeks to couch the concept of 
critical mass within numerical terms. The 
numbers support UT Austin’s argument that 
its holistic use of race in pursuit of diversity 
is not about quotas or targets, but about its 
focus upon individuals, an opportunity 
denied by the Top Ten Percent Plan. 
Achieving the critical mass requisite to 
diversity goes astray when it drifts to 
numerical metrics. UT Austin urges that it 
has made clear that looking to numbers, 
while relevant, has not been its measure of 
success; and that its goals are not captured by 
population ratios. We find this contention 
proved, mindful that by 2011, Texas high 
school graduates were majority-minority. 
UT Austin urges that its first step in narrow 
tailoring was the admission of over 80% of 
its Texas students though a facially race-
neutral process, and that Fisher’s embrace of 
the sweep of the Top Ten Percent Plan as a 
full achievement of diversity reduces critical 
mass to a numerical game and little more than 
a cover for quotas. Fisher refuses to 
acknowledge this distinction between critical 
mass—the tipping point of diversity—and a 
quota. And in seeking to quantify “critical 
mass” as a rigid numerical goal, Fisher 
misses the mark. Fisher is correct that if UT 
Austin defined its goal of diversity by the 
numbers only, the Top Ten Percent Plan 
could be calibrated to meet that mark. To do 
so, however, would deny the role of holistic 
review as a necessary complement to Top 
Ten Percent admissions. We are persuaded 
that holistic review is a necessary 
complement to the Top Ten Percent Plan, 
enabling it to operate without reducing itself 
to a cover for a quota system; that in doing 
so, its limited use of race is narrowly tailored 
to this role—as small a part as possible for the 
Plan to succeed. 
 
A 
 
The Top Ten Percent Plan is dynamic, its take 
floating year to year with the number of 
Texas high school graduates in the top ten 
percent of their class that choose to capitalize 
on their automatic admission to the flagship 
university. Its impact on the composition of 
each incoming class predictably has grown 
dramatically, leaving ever fewer holistic 
review seats available for the growing 
demographic of Texas high school graduates. 
In 1996, when the Top Ten Percent Plan was 
introduced, it admitted 42% of the Texas 
incoming class; by 2005, when the Grutter 
plan was introduced, the Plan occupied 69% 
of the seats available to Texas residents; by 
2008, when Fisher applied for admission, it 
had swelled to 81%. The increasing take of 
the Top Ten Percent Plan both enhanced its 
strengths and exacerbated its inherent 
weaknesses in composing the UT student 
body, as the overwhelming majority of seats 
was granted to students without the facial use 
of race but also without consideration of 
experiences beyond a single academic 
dimension. So as the take of the Top Ten 
Percent Plan grew, so also did the necessity 
of a complementary holistic admissions 
program to achieve the diversity envisioned 
by Bakke. 
 
A quick glance in the public record of data 
since 2008 confirms that UT Austin’s race-
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conscious holistic review program has a self-
limiting nature, one that complements UT 
Austin’s periodic review of the program’s 
necessity to ensure it is limited in time. For 
the entering class of 2009, the year after 
Fisher applied for admission, the Top Ten 
Percent Plan’s take of the seats available for 
Texas residents swelled to 86% and remained 
at 85% in 2010. 
 
This trend did not escape the Texas 
Legislature. Consistent with its long-standing 
view of holistic review as a crucial 
complement to the Top Ten Percent Plan, 
Texas passed Senate Bill 175 of the 81st 
Texas Legislature (SB 175) in 2009. SB 175 
modified the Top Ten Percent Plan for UT 
Austin to authorize the University “to limit 
automatic admission to no less than 75% of 
its enrollment capacity for first-time resident 
undergraduate students beginning with 
admission for the entering class of 2011 and 
ending with the entering class of 2015.” 
Pursuant to SB 175, UT Austin restricted 
automatic admissions to the top 7% for Fall 
2014 and Fall 2015 applicants, to the top 8% 
for Fall 2011 and Fall 2013 applicants, and to 
the top 9% for Fall 2012 applicants. All 
remaining slots continue to be filled through 
holistic review. For the entering class of 
2011, the first affected by SB 175, 74% of 
enrolled Texas residents were automatically 
admitted (with a higher percentage of offers 
of admission), a figure that again was pushed 
upward by inherent population forces, to 77% 
for the entering Texas class of 2013. 
 
In the growing shadow of the Top Ten 
Percent Plan, there was a cautious, creeping 
numerical increase in minority representation 
following the inclusion of race and ethnicity 
in the holistic review program, a testament, 
UT Austin says, to its race-conscious holistic 
review. We must agree. From 2004, the last 
facially race-neutral holistic review program 
year, to 2005, the first year that race and 
ethnicity were considered, the percentage of 
African-American students admitted to UT 
Austin climbed from 4.82% to 5.05%. The 
trend has continued since, climbing to 5.13% 
in 2006, 5.41% in 2007, and 5.67% in 2008. 
Similarly, the percentage of Hispanic 
admitted students climbed from 16.21% in 
2004, to 17.88% in 2005, 18.08% in 2006, 
19.07% in 2007, and 20.41% in 2008. The 
modest numbers only validate the targeted 
role of UT Austin’s use of Grutter. Nor can 
they be viewed as a pretext for quota 
seeking—an assertion of Fisher’s belied by 
the reality that over this time frame 
graduating Texas high school seniors 
approached being majority-minority. The 
small increases do not exceed critical mass 
nor imply a quota but instead bring a distinct 
dimension of diversity to the Top Ten Percent 
Plan. To be sure, critical mass can be used as 
a cover for quotas and proportionality goals, 
but it is not inevitable; UT Austin persuades 
that viewed objectively, under its structure, 
its efforts in holistic review have not been 
simply to expand the numbers but rather the 
diversity of individual contributions. 
 
Turning in the opposite direction from her 
claim of racial quotas, Fisher faults UT 
Austin’s holistic use of race for its de minimis 
contribution to diversity. UT Austin replies 
that this turns narrow tailoring upside down. 
We agree. Holistic review allows selection of 
an overwhelming number of students by 
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facially neutral measures and for the 
remainder race is only a factor of factors. 
Fisher’s focus on the numbers of minorities 
admitted through the holistic gate relative to 
those admitted through the Top Ten Percent 
Plan is flawed, ignoring its role as a necessary 
complement to the Plan. The apt question is 
its contribution to the richness of diversity as 
envisioned by Bakke against the backdrop of 
the Top Ten Percent Plan. That is its 
palliative role claimed by UT Austin. So 
viewed, holistic review’s low production of 
numbers is its strength, not its weakness. 
 
In sum, Fisher points to the numbers and 
nothing more in arguing that race-conscious 
admissions were no longer necessary because 
a “critical mass” of minority students had 
been achieved by the time Fisher applied for 
admission—a head count by skin color or 
surname that is not the diversity envisioned 
by Bakke and a measure it rejected. In 2007, 
Fisher emphasizes, there were 5.8% African-
American and 19.7% Hispanic enrolled 
students, which exceeds pre-Hopwood levels 
and the minority enrollment at the University 
of Michigan Law School examined in 
Grutter. But an examination that looks 
exclusively at the percentage of minority 
students fails before it begins. Indeed, as 
Grutter teaches, an emphasis on numbers in 
a mechanical admissions process is the most 
pernicious of discriminatory acts because it 
looks to race alone, treating minority students 
as fungible commodities that represent a 
single minority viewpoint. Critical mass, the 
tipping point of diversity, has no fixed upper 
bound of universal application, nor is it the 
minimum threshold at which minority 
students do not feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race. Grutter defines 
critical mass by reference to a broader view 
of diversity rather than by the achievement of 
a certain quota of minority students. Here, 
UT Austin has demonstrated a permissible 
goal of achieving the educational benefits of 
diversity within that university’s distinct 
mission, not seeking a percentage of minority 
students that reaches some arbitrary size. 
 
Implicitly conceding the need for holistic 
review, Fisher offers socioeconomic 
disadvantage as a race-neutral alternative in 
holistic review. UT Austin points to widely 
accepted scholarly work concluding that 
“there are almost six times as many white 
students as black students who both come 
from [socio-economically disadvantaged] 
families and have test scores that are above 
the threshold for gaining admission at an 
academically selective college or university.” 
At bottom, the argument is that minority 
students are disadvantaged by class, not race; 
the socioeconomic inquiry is a neutral proxy 
for race. Bakke accepts that skin color 
matters—it disadvantages and ought not be 
relevant but it is. We are ill-equipped to sort 
out race, class, and socioeconomic structures, 
and Bakke did not undertake to do so. To the 
point, we are ill-equipped to disentangle them 
and conclude that skin color is no longer an 
index of prejudice; that we would will it does 
not make it so. 
 
We are satisfied that UT Austin has 
demonstrated that race-conscious holistic 
review is necessary to make the Top Ten 
Percent Plan workable by patching the holes 
that a mechanical admissions program leaves 
in its ability to achieve the rich diversity that 
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contributes to its academic mission—as 
described by Bakke and Grutter. 
 
B 
 
Over the history of holistic review, its intake 
of students has declined, minority and non-
minority, and changed the profile of the 
students it admits—the growing number of 
applicants and increasing take of the Top Ten 
Percent Plan raises the competitive bar each 
year, before race is ever considered, for the 
decreasing number of seats filled by holistic 
review. Those admitted are those that 
otherwise would be missed in the diversity 
mix— for example, those with special talents 
beyond class rank and identifiable at the 
admission gate, and minorities with the 
experience of attending an integrated school 
with better educational resources. 
 
The data also show that white students are 
awarded the overwhelming majority of the 
highly competitive holistic review seats. As 
we have explained, the increasing take of the 
Top Ten Percent Plan is inherently self-
limiting. UT Austin has demonstrated that it 
is on a path that each year reduces the role of 
race. After the Top Ten Percent Plan 
swallowed 81% of the seats available for 
Texas students in 2008, for example, white 
Texan students admitted through holistic 
review occupied an additional 12% of the 
overall seats. Only 2.4% and 0.9% of the 
incoming class of Texas high school 
graduates were Hispanic and black students 
admitted through holistic review. That is, 
admission via the holistic review program—
overwhelmingly and disproportionally of 
white students—is highly competitive for 
minorities and non-minorities alike. These 
data persuade us of the force of UT Austin’s 
argument that a limited use of race is 
necessary to target minorities with unique 
talents and higher test scores to add the 
diversity envisioned by Bakke to the student 
body. 
 
Numbers are not controlling but they are 
relevant to UT Austin’s claimed need for 
holistic review as a necessary component of 
its admission program. In 2005, the first class 
that included race and ethnicity in holistic 
review, 176 (29%) of 617 total African-
American admitted students were admitted 
via holistic review. Following years were 
similar, with 32% of admitted African-
Americans in 2006, 35% in 2007, and 20% in 
2008. Likewise, significant percentages of 
Hispanic admitted students were admitted 
through the holistic review program, making 
up 24% of the admitted Hispanic pool in 
2005, 26% in 2006, 25% in 2007, and 15% in 
2008. These numbers directly support UT 
Austin’s contention that holistic use of race 
plays a necessary role in enabling it to 
achieve diversity while admitting upwards of 
80% of its Texas students by facially neutral 
standards, drawing as it does from a pool not 
measured solely by class rank in largely 
segregated schools. 
 
C 
 
Recall the 3.5 AI threshold that excluded 
Fisher. Holistic review for the colleges to 
which Fisher applied only admitted 
applicants—minority or non-minority—with 
a minimum AI score of 3.5. This effectively 
added to the mix a pool of applicants from 
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which those colleges could admit students 
with higher test scores and a higher predicted 
level of performance, despite being outside 
the top ten percent of their class, as part of a 
greater mosaic of talents. Insofar as some 
dispersion of minority students among many 
classes and programs is important to realizing 
the educational benefits of diversity, race-
conscious holistic review is a necessary 
complement to the Top Ten Percent Plan by 
giving high-scoring minority students a better 
chance of gaining admission to UT Austin’s 
competitive academic departments. Fisher’s 
proffered solution is for UT Austin’s more 
competitive academic programs to lower 
their gates. But this misperceives the source 
of the AI threshold for admission into the 
competitive colleges: These programs fill 
75% of their seats from the pool of students 
automatically admitted under the Top Ten 
Percent Plan. The large number of holistic 
review candidates competing for the quarter 
of the remaining seats dictates the high AI 
threshold that all applicants—minority or 
non-minority—must meet to qualify for 
admission. Fisher also points to weak 
dispersal across classes as evidence of UT 
Austin’s pursuit of numbers. It is precisely 
the opposite. We repeat, holistic review’s 
search is for diversity, as envisioned by 
Bakke, one benefit of which is its attendant 
mitigation of the clustering tendencies of the 
Top Ten Percent Plan. 
 
Fisher responds that, even if necessary, UT 
Austin could never narrowly tailor a program 
that achieves classroom diversity. In 
particular, Fisher suggests that it is 
impossible to obtain classroom-level 
diversity without some sort of fixed 
curriculum or lower school- or major-level 
standards. This argument again misses the 
mark by defining diversity only by numbers. 
UT Austin does not suggest that the end point 
of this exercise is a specific measure of 
diversity in every class or every major. 
Instead, such measures are relevant but not 
determinative signals of a want of the array 
of skills needed for diversity. In other words, 
diversity in the student body surely produces 
a degree of intra-classroom and intra-major 
diversity, with the “important and laudable” 
benefit recognized in Grutter of “classroom 
discussion [being] livelier, more spirited, and 
simply more enlightening and interesting 
when the students have the greatest possible 
variety of backgrounds.” When the holistic 
review program was modified to be race-
conscious, 90% of classes had one or zero 
African-American students, 46% had one or 
zero Asian-American students, and 43% had 
one or zero Hispanic students. This 
represented a decreasing degree of minority 
classroom dispersion since the adoption of 
the Top Ten Percent Plan. This does not mean 
that there will be some set percentage of 
African-American nuclear physics majors. 
But this does mean that UT Austin’s effort to 
ensure that African-American students with a 
broad array of skills are in the mix is both 
permissible and necessary. 
 
VII 
 
Interlacing the Top Ten Percent Plan, with its 
dependence upon segregated schools to 
produce minority enrollment, with a plan that 
did not consider race until it had a universe of 
applicants clearing a high hurdle of 
demonstrated scholastic performance 
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strongly supports UT Austin’s assertion that 
its packaging of the two was necessary in its 
pursuit of diversity. This hurdle is a product 
of a growing number of applicants competing 
for an ever-shrinking number of holistic 
review seats, creating one of the most 
competitive admissions processes in the 
country. And when race enters it is deployed 
in the holistic manner of Grutter as a factor 
of a factor. Even then the minority student 
that receives some boost for her race will 
have survived a fierce competition. These 
minorities are in a real sense, along with the 
non-minorities of this universe, overlooked 
in a facially neutral Top Ten Percent Plan that 
considers only class rank. While outside the 
Top Ten Percent Plan’s reach, they represent 
both high scholastic potential and high 
achievement in majority-white schools. We 
are persuaded that their absence would 
directly blunt efforts for a student body with 
a rich diversity of talents and experiences. 
 
“Context matters when reviewing race-based 
governmental action under the Equal 
Protection Clause,” and UT Austin’s 
admissions program is a unique creature. 
“[S]trict scrutiny must take relevant 
differences into account”—[i]ndeed, as [the 
Court has] explained, that is its fundamental 
purpose.” The precise context of UT Austin’s 
admissions demonstrates that Fisher’s charge 
is belied by this record. Her argument refuses 
to accept the admission of over 80% of its 
Texas students without facial consideration 
of race as any part of narrow tailoring, and 
critically refuses to accept that the process 
adopted for the remaining 20% is essential. It 
rests on the untenable premise that a Grutter 
plan for 100% of the admissions is to be 
preferred. UT Austin’s efforts to achieve 
diversity without facial consideration of race, 
its narrow tailoring of its admission process, 
in one of the country’s largest states, offers 
no template for others. 
 
VIII 
 
In sum, it is suggested that while holistic 
review may be a necessary and ameliorating 
complement to the Top Ten Percent Plan, UT 
Austin has not shown that its holistic review 
need include any reference to race, this 
because the Plan produces sufficient numbers 
of minorities for critical mass. This 
contention views minorities as a group, 
abjuring the focus upon individuals—each 
person’s unique potential. Race is relevant to 
minority and non-minority, notably when 
candidates have flourished as a minority in 
their school—whether they are white or 
black. Grutter reaffirmed that “[j]ust as 
growing up in a particular region or having 
particular professional experiences is likely 
to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s 
own, unique experience of being a racial 
minority in a society, like our own, in which 
race still matters.” We are persuaded that to 
deny UT Austin its limited use of race in its 
search for holistic diversity would hobble the 
richness of the educational experience in 
contradiction of the plain teachings of Bakke 
and Grutter. The need for such skill sets to 
complement the draws from majority-white 
and majority-minority schools flows directly 
from an understanding of what the Court has 
made plain diversity is not. To conclude 
otherwise is to narrow its focus to a tally of 
skin colors produced in defiance of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court which 
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eschewed the narrow metric of numbers and 
turned the focus upon individuals. This 
powerful charge does not deny the relevance 
of race. We find force in the argument that 
race here is a necessary part, albeit one of 
many parts, of the decisional matrix where 
being white in a minority-majority school can 
set one apart just as being a minority in a 
majority-white school—not a proffer of 
societal discrimination in justification for use 
of race, but a search for students with a range 
of skills, experiences, and performances—
one that will be impaired by turning a blind 
eye to the differing opportunities offered by 
the schools from whence they came.  
 
It is settled that instruments of state may 
pursue facially neutral policies calculated to 
promote equality of opportunity among 
students to whom the public schools of Texas 
assign quite different starting places in the 
annual race for seats in its flagship university. 
It is equally settled that universities may use 
race as part of a holistic admissions program 
where it cannot otherwise achieve diversity. 
This interest is compelled by the reality that 
university education is more the shaping of 
lives than the filling of heads with facts—the 
classic assertion of the humanities. Yet the 
backdrop of our efforts here includes the 
reality that accepting as permissible policies 
whose purpose is to achieve a desired racial 
effect taxes the line between quotas and 
holistic use of race towards a critical mass. 
We have hewed this line here, persuaded by 
UT Austin from this record of its necessary 
use of race in a holistic process and the want 
of workable alternatives that would not 
require even greater use of race, faithful to 
the content given to it by the Supreme Court. 
To reject the UT Austin plan is to confound 
developing principles of neutral affirmative 
action, looking away from Bakke and 
Grutter, leaving them in uniform but without 
command—due only a courtesy salute in 
passing. 
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.  
 
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge, 
dissenting: 
 
In vacating our previous opinion, Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, the Supreme Court 
clarified the strict scrutiny standard as it 
applies to cases involving racial 
classifications in higher education 
admissions: Now, reviewing courts cannot 
defer to a state actor’s argument that its 
consideration of race is narrowly tailored to 
achieve its diversity goals. Although the 
University has articulated its diversity goal as 
a “critical mass,” surprisingly, it has failed to 
define this term in any objective manner. 
Accordingly, it is impossible to determine 
whether the University’s use of racial 
classifications in its admissions process is 
narrowly tailored to its stated goal—
essentially, its ends remain unknown. 
 
By holding that the University’s use of racial 
classifications is narrowly tailored, the 
majority continues to defer impermissibly to 
the University’s claims. This deference is 
squarely at odds with the central lesson of 
Fisher. A proper strict scrutiny analysis, 
affording the University “no deference” on 
its narrow tailoring claims, compels the 
conclusion that the University’s race-
conscious admissions process does not 
survive strict scrutiny. 
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I 
As a preliminary matter, Fisher has standing 
to pursue this appeal, but not because, as the 
majority contends, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion does “not allow our reconsideration 
[of the issue of standing].” 
 
Federal courts have an affirmative duty to 
verify jurisdiction before proceeding to the 
merits. Although standing was actively 
contested before the Supreme Court, and 
although the Court’s opinion is silent about 
the issue, the Supreme Court has specifically 
warned against inferring jurisdictional 
holdings from its opinions not explicitly 
addressing that subject. Accordingly, the 
issue of standing remains open, and this court 
is obliged to address it. 
 
In our previous opinion, we held that Fisher 
had standing to “challenge [her] rejection and 
to seek money damages for [her] injury.” 
Only one relevant fact has changed since 
then—in 2012, Fisher graduated from 
Louisiana State University. The University 
contends that by graduating, “her forward-
looking request for relief became moot” 
because she could no longer seek 
reconsideration of her undergraduate 
application. Fisher’s graduation does not 
alter our previous standing analysis because, 
as she correctly observes, that determination 
did not depend on a claim for forward-
looking injunctive relief. We held that Fisher 
had standing to seek nominal monetary 
damages, and we should reach the same 
conclusion now. 
 
The University relies on Texas v. Lesage, for 
the proposition that Fisher lacks standing 
because she would not have been admitted 
regardless of her race. But even if Lesage is a 
standing case (which is a debatable 
premise—the case seems to address statutory 
liability under § 1983), it does not affect the 
outcome here. Lesage stands for the 
proposition that a plaintiff challenging 
governmental use of racial classifications 
cannot prevail if “it is undisputed that the 
government would have made the same 
decision regardless” of such use. The 
University asserts that Fisher would not have 
been admitted even if she had a “perfect” PAI 
score. The majority agrees. While Fisher 
would have been denied admission during the 
2008 admissions cycle even if she had a top 
PAI score, this is not the relevant inquiry. 
Rather, as Fisher explains, the proper 
question is whether she would have fallen 
above the admissions cut-off line if that line 
had been drawn on a race-neutral distribution 
of all applicants’ scores. This record does not 
indicate whether Fisher would have been 
admitted if race were removed from the 
admissions process altogether. At the least, 
this is a complex question that is far from 
“undisputed.” Even the University 
acknowledges that the answer to this question 
is practically unknowable: It concedes that 
re-engineering the 2008 admissions process 
by retroactively removing consideration of 
race is virtually impossible since race has an 
immeasurable, yet potentially material, 
impact on the placement of the final 
admissions cut-off lines for all programs. In 
sum, the record does not show that Fisher’s 
rejection under a race-neutral admissions 
process is “undisputed,” and remanding to 
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the district court could not alter the record in 
this regard. 
 
The University further challenges Fisher’s 
standing on redressability grounds. The 
University’s theory is that even if Fisher had 
been admitted through the race-conscious 
admissions program, and had not suffered the 
injury of rejection, she still would have paid 
the non-refundable application fee. Thus, 
says the University, because the application 
fee has no causal link to her injury, any 
judicial relief would fail to provide redress. 
This argument misconstrues the nature of 
Fisher’s alleged injury—it is not her 
rejection, but the denial of equal protection of 
the laws during the admissions decision 
process. Fisher correctly explains that the 
application fee represents nominal damages 
for the alleged constitutional harm stemming 
from the University’s improper use of racial 
classifications. Because this harm would 
have befallen Fisher whether or not she was 
ultimately admitted to the University, the 
non-refundable nature of the application fee 
is irrelevant. 
 
II 
 
Having confirmed our jurisdiction, our task is 
to apply strict scrutiny without any deference 
to the University’s claims. Because Fisher 
effected a change in the law of strict scrutiny, 
and corrected our understanding of that test 
as applied in Grutter v. Bollinger, I first 
review the current principles governing this 
“searching examination.” 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
State shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
It is canonical that the Constitution treats 
distinctions between citizens based on their 
race or ethnic origin as suspect, and that the 
Equal Protection Clause “demands that racial 
classifications . . . be subjected to the most 
rigid scrutiny.” Thus, strict scrutiny begins 
from the fundamental proposition that “any 
official action that treats a person differently 
on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect.” This is “because racial 
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant 
basis for disparate treatment.” “Distinctions 
between citizens solely because of their 
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a 
free people.” 
 
When a state university makes race-
conscious admissions decisions, those 
decisions are governed by the Equal 
Protection Clause, even though they may 
appear well-intended. Simply put, the 
Constitution does not treat race-conscious 
admissions programs differently because 
their stated aim is to help, not to harm. 
 
Under strict scrutiny, a university’s use of 
racial classifications is constitutional only if 
necessary and narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling governmental interest.  It is well-
established that there is a compelling 
governmental interest in obtaining the 
educational benefits of a diverse student 
body. Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 
confirmed this.  “The diversity that furthers a 
compelling [governmental] interest 
encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
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important element.” Thus, diversity cannot 
be defined by a “specified percentage of a 
particular group,” because such a definition 
would be “patently unconstitutional racial 
balancing.” In applying strict scrutiny, it is 
proper for courts to defer to a university’s 
decision to pursue the compelling 
governmental interest of diversity based on 
its “educational judgment that such diversity 
is essential to its educational mission.” But, 
deference to the University is appropriate on 
this point, and this point alone.  
 
Once a university has decided to pursue this 
compelling governmental interest, it must 
prove that the means chosen “to attain 
diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.” 
In this, the strict scrutiny test takes the 
familiar form of a “means-to-ends” analysis: 
The compelling governmental interest is the 
ends, and the government program or law—
here, the University’s race-conscious 
admissions program—is the means. Strict 
scrutiny places the burden of proving narrow 
tailoring firmly with the government. And, 
furthermore, narrow tailoring must be 
established “with clarity.”  
 
Before this case, the Supreme Court had 
issued only three major decisions addressing 
affirmative action in higher education 
admissions: Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter. In 
Fisher, the Court made clear that this line of 
cases does not stand apart from “broader 
equal protection jurisprudence.” Rather, “the 
analysis and level of scrutiny applied to 
determine the validity of [a racial 
classification] do not vary simply because the 
objective appears acceptable . . . .”  
 
In Fisher, the Supreme Court modified the 
narrow tailoring calculus applied in higher 
education affirmative action cases. While the 
overarching principles from Bakke, Gratz, 
and Grutter—that a university can have a 
compelling interest in attaining the 
educational benefits of diversity, and that its 
admissions program must be narrowly 
tailored to serve this interest—were taken “as 
given,” the Fisher Court altered the 
application of those principles in a critical 
way. Now, courts must give “no deference,” 
state actor’s assertion that its chosen “means 
. . . to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to 
that goal.” In so doing, the Fisher Court 
embraced Justice Kennedy’s position on 
“deference” from Grutter. Thus, under the 
current principles governing review of race-
conscious admissions programs, providing 
any deference to a state actor’s claim that its 
use of race is narrowly tailored is 
“antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent 
with it.”  
 
Because the higher-education affirmative 
action cases do not stand apart from “broader 
equal protection jurisprudence,” strict 
scrutiny must be applied with the same 
analytical rigor deployed in those other 
contexts. Put simply, there is no special form 
of strict scrutiny unique to higher education 
admissions decisions. Accordingly, we must 
now evaluate narrow tailoring by ensuring 
that “the means chosen ‘fit’ the [compelling 
governmental interest] so closely that there is 
little or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype.” Narrow tailoring 
further requires that “the reviewing court 
verify that it is necessary for a university to 
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use race to achieve the educational benefits 
of diversity.” To do so, we must carefully 
inquire into whether the University “could 
achieve sufficient diversity without using 
racial classifications.” Establishing narrow 
tailoring does not require the University to 
show that it exhausted every possible race-
neutral option, but it must meet its “ultimate 
burden of demonstrating, before turning to 
racial classifications, that available, workable 
race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.” 
 
Of course, all of the above must be 
underscored by the principle that using racial 
classifications is permissible only as a “last 
resort to achieve a compelling interest.”  
 
III 
 
Here, the University has framed its goal as 
obtaining a “critical mass” of campus 
diversity. To uphold the use of race under 
strict scrutiny, courts must find narrow 
tailoring through a close “fit” between this 
goal and the admissions program’s 
consideration of race. Accordingly, the 
controlling question becomes the definition 
of “critical mass”—the University’s stated 
goal. In order for us to determine whether its 
use of racial classifications in the admissions 
program is narrowly tailored to its goal, the 
University must explain its goal, and do so 
“with clarity.” On this record, it has not done 
so. 
The majority entirely overlooks the 
University’s failure to define its “critical 
mass” objective for the purposes of assessing 
narrow tailoring. This is the crux of this 
case—absent a meaningful explanation of its 
desired ends, the University cannot prove 
narrow tailoring under its strict scrutiny 
burden. Indeed, the majority repeatedly 
invokes the term “critical mass” without even 
questioning its definition. Under Fisher, it is 
not enough for a court to simply state, as does 
the majority, that it is not deferring to the 
University’s narrow tailoring arguments. 
Rather, the reviewing court’s actual analysis 
must demonstrate that “no deference” has 
been afforded. Here, the majority’s failure to 
make a meaningful inquiry into the nature of 
“critical mass” constitutes precisely such 
deference. 
Certainly, as explained below, I agree that 
“critical mass” does not require a precise 
numerical definition. But, to meet its narrow 
tailoring burden, the University must explain 
its goal to us in some meaningful way. We 
cannot undertake a rigorous ends-to-means 
narrow tailoring analysis when the University 
will not define the ends. We cannot tell 
whether the admissions program closely 
“fits” the University’s goal when it fails to 
objectively articulate its goal. Nor can we 
determine whether considering race is 
necessary for the University to achieve 
“critical mass,” or whether there are effective 
race-neutral alternatives, when it has not 
described what “critical mass” requires. 
At best, the University’s attempted 
articulations of “critical mass” before this 
court are subjective, circular, or tautological. 
The University explains only that its 
“concept of critical mass is defined by 
reference to the educational benefits that 
diversity is designed to produce.” And, in 
attempting to address when it is likely to 
achieve critical mass, the University explains 
only that it will “cease its consideration of 
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race when it determines . . . that the 
educational benefits of diversity can be 
achieved at UT through a race-neutral policy 
. . . .” These articulations are insufficient. 
Under the rigors of strict scrutiny, the 
judiciary must “verify that it is necessary for 
a university to use race to achieve the 
educational benefits of diversity.” It is not 
possible to perform this function when the 
University’s objective is unknown, 
unmeasurable, or unclear. 
The exacting scrutiny required by the 
Supreme Court’s “broader equal protection 
jurisprudence” is entirely absent from today’s 
opinion, which holds that the University has 
proven narrow tailoring even though it has 
failed to meaningfully articulate its diversity 
goals. 
A 
The University’s failure to define 
meaningfully its “critical mass” objective is 
manifest in its various strict scrutiny 
arguments. The University claims that its use 
of racial classifications is necessary and 
narrowly tailored because (1) quantitative 
metrics reflect an inadequate minority 
presence; (2) qualitative diversity is lacking; 
(3) certain selective colleges are 
insufficiently diverse; (4) its periodic review 
demonstrates that its goals have not yet been 
achieved; and (5) its use of racial 
classifications is almost identical to that 
approved in Grutter. Each of these arguments 
falls short—either overlooking a more 
narrowly tailored alternative or eliding any 
articulation of how this specific use of racial 
classification advances the University’s 
objective. 
1 
First, while not defining its “critical mass” 
goal with reference to specific quantitative 
objectives, the University claims that 
quantitative metrics are relevant in measuring 
its progress. The University “based its critical 
mass determination on several data points, 
including hard data on minority admissions, 
enrollment, and racial isolation” and found 
that its use of racial classifications “does 
increase minority enrollment.” Accepting 
that such metrics bear some relevance to the 
University’s progress, this is insufficient to 
satisfy strict scrutiny. The University does 
not explain how admitting a very small 
number of minority applicants under the 
race-conscious admissions plan is necessary 
to advancing its diversity goal. 
It is undeniable that the University admits 
only a small number of minority students 
under race-conscious holistic review. In 
2008, the sole year at issue in this case, less 
than 20% of the class was evaluated under the 
race-conscious holistic review process. Even 
if we assume that all minority students who 
were admitted and enrolled in that year 
through the race-conscious holistic review 
process gained admission because of their 
race, this number is strikingly small—only 
216 African-American and Hispanic students 
in an entering class of 6,322. The University 
fails to explain how this small group 
contributes to its “critical mass” objective. 
“Racial classifications are simply too 
pernicious to permit any but the most exact 
connection between justification and [racial] 
classification.” But here, the University has 
not established a clear and definite 
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connection between its chosen means and its 
desired ends of “critical mass.” 
To be clear, I agree that a race-conscious 
admissions plan need not have a “dramatic or 
lopsided impact” on minority enrollment 
numbers to survive strict scrutiny, as the 
University reads Fisher’s arguments to 
suggest. But neither can the University prove 
the necessity of its racial classification 
without meaningfully explaining how a 
small, marginal increase in minority 
admissions is necessary to achieving its 
diversity goals. Thus, neither the small (and 
decreasing) percentage of minority holistic-
review admittees, nor minorities’ “under-
representation” in holistic review admissions 
relative to whites, taken alone, demonstrates 
narrow tailoring. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, diversity 
cannot be assessed by strictly quantitative 
metrics, and, to the extent that numbers could 
be relevant in assessing “critical mass,” the 
University leaves this relevance entirely 
unexplained. 
2 
The University advances a second 
understanding of “critical mass,” which I will 
refer to as “qualitative.” Under this theory, 
the University says its goal is not boosting 
minority enrollment numbers alone, but 
rather promoting the quality of minority 
enrollment—in short, diversity within 
diversity. The University submits that its 
race-conscious holistic review allows it to 
select for “other types of diversity” beyond 
race alone, and to identify the most “talented, 
academically promising, and well-rounded” 
minority students. According to the 
University, these are crucial “change agents” 
who debunk stereotypes but who may fall 
outside the top 10% of their high school 
classes. 
As a preliminary matter, these stated ends are 
too imprecise to permit the requisite strict 
scrutiny analysis. The University has not 
provided any concrete targets for admitting 
more minority students possessing these 
unique qualitative-diversity characteristics—
that is, the “other types of diversity” beyond 
race alone. At what point would this 
qualitative diversity target be achieved? 
Because its ends are unknown to us, the 
University cannot meet its strict scrutiny 
burden. 
But, even accepting the University’s broad 
and generic qualitative diversity ends, we 
cannot conclude that the race-conscious 
policy is constitutionally “necessary.” The 
University has not shown that qualitative 
diversity is absent among the minority 
students admitted under the race-neutral Top 
Ten Percent Law. That is, the University does 
not evaluate the diversity present in this 
group before deploying racial classifications 
to fill the remaining seats. The University 
does not assess whether Top Ten Percent 
Law admittees exhibit sufficient diversity 
within diversity, whether the requisite 
“change agents” are among them, and 
whether these admittees are able, collectively 
or individually, to combat pernicious 
stereotypes. There is no such evaluation 
despite the fact that Top Ten Percent Law 
admittees also submit applications with 
essays, and are even assigned PAI scores for 
purposes of admission to individual schools. 
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Evaluating the composition of these 
admittees—80% of the class in 2008—before 
deploying racial classifications in the holistic 
admissions program might well reveal that 
racial classifications are not necessary to 
achieve the University’s qualitative diversity 
goals.  
In effect, the University asks this Court to 
assume that minorities admitted under the 
Top Ten Percent Law do not demonstrate 
“diversity within diversity”—that they are 
somehow more homogenous, less dynamic, 
and more undesirably stereotypical than 
those admitted under holistic review. Thus, 
the University claims, absent its race-
conscious holistic admissions program, it 
would lose the minority students necessary to 
achieving a qualitative critical mass. But it 
offers no evidence in the record to prove this, 
and we must therefore refuse to make this 
assumption. 
Regrettably, the majority firmly adopts this 
assumption—that minority students from 
majority-minority Texas high schools are 
inherently limited in their ability to 
contribute to the University’s vision of a 
diverse student body. The majority reasons 
that race-conscious holistic review is a 
“necessary complement,” to the Top Ten 
Percent Law, which, on its own, would admit 
insufficient “students of unique talents and 
backgrounds who can enrich the diversity of 
the student body in distinct ways.” The 
majority’s discussion of numerous 
“resegregated” Texas school districts is 
premised on the dangerous assumption that 
students from those districts (at least those in 
the top ten percent of each class) do not 
possess the qualities necessary for the 
University of Texas to establish a meaningful 
campus diversity. In this, it has embraced the 
very ill that the Equal Protection Clause seeks 
to banish.  
Moreover, the only fact from which the 
majority draws this alarming conclusion is 
the mere reality that these districts serve 
majority-minority communities. By 
accepting the University’s standing 
presumption that minority students admitted 
under the Top Ten Percent Law do not 
possess the characteristics necessary to 
achieve a campus environment defined by 
“qualitative diversity,” the majority engages 
in the very stereotyping that the Equal 
Protection Clause abhors. 
The record does not indicate that the 
University evaluates students admitted under 
the Top Ten Percent Law, checking for 
indicia of qualitative diversity—diversity 
within diversity—before determining that 
race should be considered in the holistic 
review process to fill the remaining seats in 
the class. If the Top Ten Percent Law 
admittees were a sufficiently qualitatively 
diverse population, which they may well be 
so far as I can tell, then using race in holistic 
review to promote further diversity might not 
be necessary for the University to achieve its 
goal, and an up-front assessment of these 
admittees, before turning to race, could be a 
more narrowly-tailored option. And, in any 
event, the University offers no method for 
this court to determine when, if ever, its goal 
(which remains undefined) for qualitative 
diversity will be reached. Accordingly, the 
University has failed to carry its strict 
scrutiny burden of proving that its race-
conscious admissions policy is necessary to 
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achieving its diversity objective of a 
“qualitative” critical mass. 
3 
In earlier stages of this case, the University 
framed its diversity goal as achieving 
“classroom diversity.” The University 
suggested that classroom diversity and the 
distribution of minority students among 
colleges and majors were meaningful metrics 
in determining whether “critical mass” had 
been attained. And, indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that increased diversity 
of perspectives in the classroom provides for 
a “livelier, more spirited, and simply more 
enlightening and interesting” experience. 
However, the University has distanced itself 
from this previously asserted goal, now 
claiming it “has never pursued classroom 
diversity as a discrete interest or endpoint,” 
but merely as “one of many factors” to be 
considered in evaluating diversity. Given the 
University’s failure to press the classroom 
diversity argument in its briefing on remand, 
the issue is almost certainly waived. 
Notwithstanding this waiver, the majority 
addresses the issue of classroom diversity, 
contending that the University’s race-
conscious admissions policy is necessary to 
give “high-scoring minority students a better 
chance of gaining admission to UT Austin’s 
competitive academic departments.” 
Perhaps, based on the structure of the 
University’s admissions process, it is 
possible that the use of race as a factor in 
calculating an applicant’s PAI score 
incrementally increases the odds that a 
minority applicant will be admitted to a 
competitive college within the University. 
But hypothetical considerations are not 
enough to meet a state actor’s burden under 
strict scrutiny. Rather, assuming that the 
University’s diversity goal is establishing 
classroom diversity, it is the University that 
bears the burden of proving that the use of 
race in calculating the PAI scores is 
necessary to furthering this goal. But instead 
of explaining how race enhances minority 
students’ prospects of admission to a 
competitive college or major, the University 
admissions officers’ deposition testimony 
specifically indicates that race could not be a 
decisive factor in any applicant’s admission, 
and that it is impossible to determine whether 
race was in fact decisive for any particular 
applicant’s admission decision. Absent any 
record evidence of the potential for race to be 
a decisive factor, the University cannot 
establish, as the majority claims, that its 
racial classifications could actually give any 
minority applicant “a better chance” of 
admission to a competitive college. 
In short, the University has obscured its use 
of race to the point that even its own officers 
cannot explain the impact of race on 
admission to competitive colleges. If race is 
indeed without a discernable impact, the 
University cannot carry its burden of proving 
that race-conscious holistic review is 
necessary to achieving classroom diversity 
(or, for that matter, any kind of diversity). 
Because the role played by race in the 
admissions decision is essentially 
unknowable, I cannot find that these racial 
classifications are necessary or narrowly 
tailored to achieving the University’s interest 
in diversity. 
4 
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The University further claims that its race-
conscious admissions program is narrowly 
tailored because, with the help of a rigorous 
periodic review system, it will “cease its 
consideration of race when it determines . . . 
that the educational benefits of diversity can 
be achieved at [the University] through a 
race-neutral policy ‘at reasonable cost’ to its 
other educational objectives.” The University 
seeks to assure us that periodic review of its 
admissions policy considers enrollment data, 
“evidence of racial isolation and the racial 
climate on campus,” and “other data 
including the educational benefits of 
diversity experienced in the classroom.” In 
simple language, the University asserts that it 
knows critical mass when it sees it. 
On one level, the University’s review process 
captures the essence of the holistic diversity 
interest established in Bakke, validated in 
Grutter, and left intact by Fisher. In fact, the 
Grutter Court discussed the important role 
that such reviews can play in determining 
whether racial classifications have 
continuing necessity under strict scrutiny.  
Nonetheless, there are two distinct flaws with 
the University’s assurances that its own, 
internal, periodic review is sufficient to 
safeguard against any unconstitutional use of 
race. First, strict scrutiny does not allow the 
judiciary to delegate wholesale to state actors 
the task of determining whether a race-
conscious admissions policy continues to be 
necessary. This is the very point made by the 
Fisher Court, in vacating our previous 
opinion for deferring to the University’s 
narrow-tailoring claims.  
Second, while the University correctly 
considers a range of factors in its assessment 
of the necessity of its use of race, it has still 
not explained to us how this consideration 
takes place. In describing its periodic review 
process, the University never explains how 
the various factors are measured, the weight 
afforded to each, and what combination 
thereof would yield a “critical mass” of 
diversity sufficient to cease use of racial 
classifications. 
In light of this, I cannot determine that the 
race-conscious admissions program is 
narrowly tailored to the University’s goal. 
The University, in effect, defines critical 
mass as a nebulous amalgam of factors—
enrollment data, racial isolation, racial 
climate, and “the educational benefits of 
diversity”—that its internal periodic review 
is calibrated to detect. But, without more, the 
University fails to prove narrow tailoring 
with clarity. Such a bare submission, in 
essence, begs for the deference that is 
irreconcilable with “meaningful” judicial 
review. 
5 
Lastly, the University submits that its race-
conscious admissions policy necessarily 
satisfies narrow tailoring because it is closely 
modeled on the admissions program upheld 
by the Supreme Court in Grutter. Similarly, 
the majority implies that the race-conscious 
admissions policy’s similarity to Grutter is, 
itself, a meaningful factor in our strict 
scrutiny analysis. This claim is unpersuasive. 
Fisher confirms that we are obligated to 
consider the particular challenged race-
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conscious program on its own terms and ask 
whether the University “could achieve 
sufficient diversity without using racial 
classifications.” Strict scrutiny is not a 
hypothetical undertaking, but rather 
“imposes on the university the ultimate 
burden of demonstrating, before turning to 
racial classifications, that available, workable 
race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.” 
Certain aspects of the University’s 
admissions policy do parallel the features of 
the plan upheld in Grutter—race is only a 
sub-factor within a holistic, individualized 
review process, and the University’s goal is 
framed in terms of “critical mass.” But the 
University, under mandate by the Texas 
Legislature’s Top Ten Percent Law, admits 
the majority of its entering class through a 
separate, race-neutral scheme. This 
inevitably impacts the narrow tailoring 
calculus presently under consideration. That 
is, while the University’s race-conscious 
admissions policy is conceptually derived 
from the University of Michigan Law 
School’s approach, the two are quite distinct 
in practice: The University’s holistic review 
coexists with a separate process that admits a 
large population of students, a circumstance 
not contemplated in Grutter. 
Similarity to Grutter is not a narrow-tailoring 
talisman that insulates the University’s policy 
from strict scrutiny. The University’s burden 
is to prove that its own use of racial 
classifications is necessary and narrowly 
tailored for achieving its own diversity 
objectives. 
B 
Ultimately, the record is devoid of any 
specifically articulated connection between 
the University’s diversity goal of “critical 
mass” and its race-conscious admissions 
process. The University has not shown how it 
determines the existence, or lack, of a 
“critical mass” of diversity in its student 
population. Rather, the University only 
frames its goal as “obtaining the educational 
benefits of diversity.” This is entirely circular 
reasoning that cannot satisfy the rigorous 
means-to-ends analysis required under strict 
scrutiny.  
To be clear, my concern is not with the 
University’s use of the term “critical mass” 
itself. Even if the University were to adopt 
another rhetorical construct to explain its 
diversity objectives, it faces the same 
underlying problem—it does not offer a clear 
and definite articulation of its goal sufficient 
for a reviewing court to verify narrow 
tailoring. The University’s failure to meet its 
strict scrutiny burden is a function of its 
undefined ends, not its choice to label those 
ends as “critical mass.” 
IV 
The majority concludes that the University’s 
race-conscious admissions program is 
narrowly tailored because the University has 
exhausted all workable alternatives.  Much of 
today’s opinion explores the historical 
“narrative” of the University’s admissions 
process, including many race-neutral 
recruitment programs intended to bolster 
minority enrollment. And, indeed, the 
University’s many efforts to achieve a 
diverse campus learning environment 
without resorting to racial classifications are 
 217 
commendable. But, framing this history as 
something akin to a process of elimination, 
the majority finds that the University’s race-
conscious admissions program must be 
necessary and narrowly tailored to the 
University’s diversity objectives. This is 
insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.  
Certainly, the University’s past experiences 
with race-neutral initiatives are relevant to 
the inquiry because the University must 
establish that “no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational 
benefits of diversity,” and because the 
University’s “experience and expertise” 
provide some context to inform judicial 
review. However, we cannot conclude that 
the University’s current race-conscious 
admissions program—the only matter before 
this court—is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the educational benefits of diversity because 
the University has failed to define what it 
means by “critical mass.” In other words, the 
University’s long history of purportedly 
unsuccessful alternatives is meaningless if 
we cannot discern the contours of the success 
it now seeks. 
Additionally, the majority’s sustained focus 
on the Top Ten Percent Law is misplaced. 
While the Law is indeed central to this case, 
here, as in our previous consideration of this 
appeal, “[n]o party challenged, in the district 
court or in this court, the validity or the 
wisdom of the Top Ten Percent Law.” 
Nevertheless, the majority forcefully indicts 
the Law for frustrating the University’s 
efforts to achieve well-rounded diversity. In 
the majority’s view, the Law’s shortcomings 
make a holistic review program more 
necessary. At most, the Law’s mechanical 
operation—admitting students based on the 
sole metric of high school class rank—might 
suggest that some form of holistic review is 
advisable to supplement the admissions 
process. But this issue is not before us at all. 
Our task is to determine whether the 
University’s injection of race into its 
admissions process survives strict scrutiny.  
The Top Ten Percent Law matters only 
insofar as it causes the University to admit a 
large number of minority students separate 
and apart from the holistic review process. 
That is, the Law creates a separate admissions 
channel for many minority students, which 
then calls into question the necessity of using 
race as a factor in the holistic review process 
for filling the remaining seats. Whether, in 
light of the Top Ten Percent Law, race-
conscious holistic review is more or less 
necessary is an open question, and it is the 
University that bears the burden of 
explaining how the Law impacts its 
achievement of its diversity goal. Here, it has 
failed to do so, under any theory of “critical 
mass” it has proffered. 
* * * 
The material facts of this case have remained 
unchanged since the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, but the governing law 
has changed markedly. Fisher established 
that strict scrutiny in the higher education 
affirmative action setting is no different than 
strict scrutiny in other equal protection 
contexts—the state actor receives no 
deference in proving that its chosen race-
conscious means are narrowly tailored to its 
ends. The majority fails to give Fisher its 
proper weight. Today’s opinion sidesteps the 
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new strict scrutiny standard and continues to 
defer to the University’s claims that its use of 
racial classifications is narrowly tailored to 
its diversity goal. Because the University has 
not defined its diversity goal in any 
meaningful way—instead, reflexively 
reciting the term “critical mass”—it is 
altogether impossible to determine whether 
its use of racial classifications is narrowly 
tailored. 
This is not to say, however, that it is 
impossible for a public university to define its 
diversity ends adequately for a court to verify 
narrow tailoring with the requisite exacting 
scrutiny. After all, “[s]trict scrutiny must not 
be strict in theory but fatal in fact.” It may 
even be possible for a university to do so 
while seeking a “critical mass.” What matters 
now, after Fisher, is that a state actor’s 
diversity goals must be sufficiently clear and 
definite such that a reviewing court can 
assess, without deference, whether its 
particular use of racial classifications is 
necessary and narrowly tailored to those 
goals. On this record, the University has not 
“offered sufficient evidence that would prove 
that its admissions program is narrowly 
tailored to obtain the educational benefits of 
diversity.” Accordingly, I would reverse and 
render judgment for Fisher. I respectfully 
dissent. 
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“Supreme Court to Weigh Race in College Admissions” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 29, 2015
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
take a second look at the use of race in 
admissions decisions by the University of 
Texas at Austin, reviving a potent challenge 
to affirmative action in higher education. 
The move, which supporters of race-
conscious admissions programs called 
baffling and ominous, signaled that the court 
may limit or even end such affirmative 
action. The advocates speculated that the 
court’s most conservative members had cast 
the four votes needed to grant review of the 
case in the hope that Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy would supply the fifth vote to strike 
down the Texas admissions plan. 
Justice Kennedy has never voted to uphold an 
affirmative action program. 
The consequences would be striking if the 
court sided with the plaintiff in the case, a 
white woman named Abigail Fisher, and did 
away with racial preferences in higher 
education. It would, all sides agree, reduce 
the number of black and Latino students at 
nearly every selective college and graduate 
school, with more Asian-American and white 
students gaining entrance instead.  
“Over the last few days, liberals have been 
celebrating a string of important victories 
involving health care and same-sex 
marriage,” said Justin Driver, a law professor 
at the University of Chicago. “But liberals 
have also been bracing themselves for the 
other shoe to drop. This decision to grant 
review means, at a minimum, that the other 
shoe will remain suspended in midair for the 
next several months.” 
A decision barring the use of race in 
admissions would undo a 2003 ruling that the 
majority said it expected to last for 25 years. 
In that 5-to-4 decision, in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the Supreme Court said that public 
colleges and universities could not use a point 
system to increase minority enrollment but 
could take race into account in vaguer ways 
to ensure academic diversity. 
The case that the court agreed on Monday to 
hear, Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 14-
981, arose from a lawsuit filed by Ms. Fisher, 
who said the university had denied her 
admission based on her race. She has since 
graduated from Louisiana State University. 
In a statement, Ms. Fisher said, “I hope the 
justices will rule that U.T. is not allowed to 
treat undergraduate applicants differently 
because of their race or ethnicity.” 
Gregory L. Fenves, the president of the 
University of Texas at Austin, said his 
school’s admissions program was lawful. 
“Under the Supreme Court’s existing 
precedent, the university’s commitment to 
using race as one factor in an individualized, 
holistic admissions policy allows us to 
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assemble a student body that brings with it 
the educational benefits of diversity for all 
students,” he said in a statement. “Our 
admissions policy is narrowly tailored, 
constitutional and has been upheld by the 
courts multiple times.” 
When the court last considered Ms. Fisher’s 
case in 2013, supporters of affirmative action 
were nervous. But the court deferred 
conclusive action in what appeared to be a 
compromise decision. 
In 2013, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, said the federal appeals court in 
New Orleans had been insufficiently 
skeptical of the Texas program, which has 
unusual features. The appeals court then 
endorsed the program for a second time. 
In returning to the case, at least some justices 
seemed ready to issue a major decision on the 
role race may play in government decision 
making. 
Most applicants from Texas are admitted 
under a part of the program that guarantees 
admission to top students in every high 
school in the state. (This is often called the 
Top 10 program, though the percentage 
cutoff can vary by year.) 
The Top 10 program has produced significant 
racial and ethnic diversity. In 2011, for 
instance, 26 percent of freshmen who 
enrolled under the program were Hispanic, 
and 6 percent were black. Texas is about 38 
percent Hispanic and 12 percent black. 
The remaining Texas students and those from 
elsewhere are considered under standards 
that take account of academic achievement 
and other factors, including race and 
ethnicity. Many colleges and universities 
base all of their admissions decisions on such 
“holistic” grounds. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court endorsed such 
holistic admissions programs in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, saying it was permissible to 
consider race as one factor among many to 
achieve educational diversity. Writing for the 
majority in that case, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor said she expected that “25 years 
from now,” the “use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary.” 
The question in the Texas case was whether 
the flagship state university was entitled to 
supplement its race-neutral Top 10 program 
with a race-conscious holistic one. 
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher 
v. University of Texas reaffirmed that 
educational diversity is an interest sufficient 
to overcome the general ban on racial 
classifications by the government. But it 
added that public institutions must have good 
reasons for the methods they use to achieve 
that goal. 
Colleges and universities, Justice Kennedy 
wrote, must demonstrate that “available, 
workable race-neutral alternatives do not 
suffice” before using race in admissions 
decisions. 
Courts reviewing government programs that 
make distinctions based on race subject them 
to a form of judicial review known as “strict 
scrutiny,” which requires the government to 
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identify a compelling goal and a close fit 
between means and ends. 
Last year, in its second encounter with the 
case, a divided three-judge panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, in New Orleans, ruled that the Texas 
admissions plan satisfied strict scrutiny. 
“We are persuaded that to deny U.T. Austin 
its limited use of race in its search for holistic 
diversity would hobble the richness of the 
educational experience,” Judge Patrick E. 
Higginbotham wrote for the majority. 
The Top 10 program is inadequate, he said, 
because it is a blunt instrument and a product 
of widespread segregation in Texas high 
schools. 
In dissent, Judge Emilio M. Garza said the 
university’s justifications for using race were 
“subjective, circular or tautological.” 
As in the earlier appeal, Justice Elena Kagan 
has recused herself from the case because she 
worked on it as United States solicitor 
general. 
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“Fisher v. Texas Dismissed Again; Is it Headed Back to Supreme 
Court?” 
Forbes 
Daniel Fisher 
July 15, 2014 
 
An appeals court dismissed the affirmative-
action lawsuit of frustrated University of 
Texas applicant Abigail Fisher after 
reconsidering it in light of last year’s U.S. 
Supreme Court decision tightening the 
standards for race-conscious college 
admissions. The appeals-court ruling drew a 
strong dissent that suggested the majority got 
it wrong, however, and if Fisher follows up 
on her vow to appeal the question may wind 
up in front of the Supreme Court again. 
In a decision released today, two of the three 
judges on a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in New Orleans held that Fisher 
failed to make her case that UT had engaged 
in unconstitutional discrimination by using 
race as a factor in some of its admissions 
decisions. 
“We find force in the argument that race here 
is a necessary part, albeit one of many parts, 
of the decisional matrix,” Judge Patrick 
Higgenbotham wrote, in an opinion joined by 
Judge Carolyn Dineen King. 
Fisher, who is white, was rejected by UT in 
2004 and subsequently graduated from 
another university, but her case has lived on 
as a key challenge to the constitutionality of 
affirmative action. In a strong dissent, Judge 
Emilio M. Garza said the majority allowed 
the school to escape the strict scrutiny 
required under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Fisher vs. University of Texas. 
 “Simply put, the Constitution does not treat 
race -conscious admissions programs 
differently because their stated aim is to help, 
not to harm,” Garza wrote. By allowing UT 
to set a vague goal of “critical mass” for 
certain minorities — primarily black and 
Latino students — Garza said, the majority 
failed to give Fisher the opportunity to prove 
that the UT program wasn’t narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling state goal. “Critical 
mass” was never defined in the pleadings and 
the majority also failed to address the 
question of how anybody could determine 
when it has been achieved, he said. 
“Accordingly, it is impossible to determine 
whether the University’s use of racial 
classifications in its admissions process is 
narrowly tailored to its stated goal — 
essentially, its ends remain unknown,” he 
said. 
Fisher’s lawyer Edward Blum told the Los 
Angeles Times his client would appeal this 
latest decision. 
“We are disappointed,” Blum said. “But this 
court was proven wrong by the Supreme 
Court in 2013 and we believe they will be 
proven wrong again.” 
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The Fifth Circuit majority opinion examined 
the recent history of UT admissions and 
concluded that the university had achieved 
substantial diversity by admitting the 
majority of students under the so-called Top 
Ten Percent plan, which requires UT to 
accept any students in the top 10% of their 
high school classes. That plan, required by 
state law, is designed to make a virtue out of 
the severe racial and ethnic segregation in 
Texas public schools by forcing the 
university to accept applicants from diverse 
backgrounds. 
This race-neutral policy, which supplies 
more than 80% of students, works against 
black and Latino students who find 
themselves in majority-white schools and 
other well-rounded applicants outside the top 
10% of their classes. 
“With its blindness to all but the single 
dimension of class rank, the Top Ten Percent 
Plan came with significant costs to diversity 
and academic integrity, passing over large 
numbers of highly qualified minority and non 
-minority applicants,” Higgenbotham wrote. 
To address the “nearly intractable problem” 
of racial and ethnic diversity, the school 
adopted a “holistic review” process that the 
Supreme Court approved in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, a 2003 decision upholding a 
University of Michigan Law School 
affirmative action program. That program 
considered race as one of a number of 
qualifications for admission; in UT’s case, 
race was among a bundle of factors that had 
a slightly higher weighting than essays. 
Only a minority of students are accepted 
through the holistic review process and the 
majority of those are white. In the year Fisher 
applied, 17,000 applicants who applied 
outside the Top Ten Percent program 
competed for 1,200 remaining seats at the 
38,000-student school. 
Fisher argued the minimal impact of the 
holistic review process argued against it 
being an essential tool for achieving a policy 
goal, and Garza agreed. The university failed 
to explain, and the majority failed to require 
to it to explain, how the program advanced 
the goal of diversity, he said. 
Garza also criticized the “alarming 
conclusion” of the majority that the Top Ten 
Percent plan didn’t accept enough minority 
students, or not the right type of candidates. 
The court assumes, he said, “that minority 
students from majority-minority Texas high 
schools are inherently limited in their ability 
to contribute to the University’s vision of a 
diverse student body.” 
The proper analysis would allow the 
university to determine that racial and ethnic 
diversity are important goals, he said, but 
leave to courts the decision of whether the 
tools the university uses are narrowly tailored 
to achieve them. 
“Because the role played by race in the 
admissions decision is essentially 
unknowable, I cannot find that these racial 
classifications are necessary or narrowly 
tailored to achieving the University’s interest 
in diversity,” said Garza, a George H.W. 
Bush appointee. 
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The decision and dissent illustrate the almost 
intractable conflict between opponents and 
supporters of affirmative action as the 
Supreme Court continues to chip away at the 
allowable uses of race in government 
decisions. The majority, relying on earlier 
Supreme Court decisions, says UT can 
continue to pursue the goal of diversity, 
which it defines as some unspecified, higher 
number of black and Latino students. Garza 
hews to the absolutist line of Chief Justice 
John Roberts, who once famously declared: 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of race is to stop discriminating on the basis 
of race.” 
Garza, citing the landmark 1967 decision in 
Loving v. Virginia, striking down that state’s 
law against interracial marriages, said: “Any 
official action that treats a person differently 
on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect.” 
It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court 
will find enough material in the majority’s 
decision to accept yet another appeal of this 
long-running case.  
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“Finally! The Fisher Decision in Plain English” 
SCOTUSBlog 
Amy Howe 
June 24, 2013 
Today the Court finally issued its decision in 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the 
challenge to that school’s use of race in its 
undergraduate admissions process.  Since the 
Court announced last year that it would 
review the case, the university and supporters 
of affirmative action had feared the 
worst:  that the Court would strike down not 
only the university’s policy, but affirmative 
action more generally.  This morning the 
university learned that its admissions policy 
will at least live to fight another day, but it 
will face a tough test when the case goes back 
to the lower courts for further 
proceedings.  Let’s take a look in Plain 
English. 
As I explained in an earlier post, the case was 
filed by Abigail Fisher, a young woman from 
Texas who applied to the university but was 
rejected.  Fisher, who is white, then filed a 
lawsuit, arguing that she had been a victim of 
racial discrimination because minority 
students with less impressive credentials than 
hers had been admitted.  The university 
prevailed in the lower courts, but found a 
skeptical audience among the conservative 
Justices at oral argument at the Supreme 
Court.  Although Fisher and her lawyers 
made clear that they were not asking the 
Court to overrule its 2003 decision in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, ruling that the University of 
Michigan Law School could consider race in 
its admissions process as part of its efforts to 
achieve a diverse student body, the Court 
nonetheless seemed ready to put real 
restrictions on when and how universities can 
consider race. 
Today a broad majority of the Court 
reinforced that affirmative action must be 
strictly reviewed, but it did not outlaw those 
programs.  In an opinion that required only 
thirteen pages, the Court explained that a 
university’s use of race must meet a test 
known as “strict scrutiny.”  Under this test, a 
university’s use of affirmative action will be 
constitutional only if it is “narrowly 
tailored.”  The Court in Fisher took pains to 
make clear exactly what this means:  courts 
can no longer simply rubber-stamp a 
university’s determination that it needs to use 
affirmative action to have a diverse student 
body.  Instead, courts themselves will need to 
confirm that the use of race is “necessary” – 
that is, that there is no other realistic 
alternative that does not use race that would 
also create a diverse student body.  Because 
the lower court had not done so, the Court 
sent the case back for it to determine whether 
the university could make this showing. 
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court’s 
opinion, but he also wrote a separate, one-
paragraph concurring opinion in which he 
made clear that, if Fisher and her lawyers had 
asked the Court to do so, he would have voted 
to overrule the 2003 decision in Grutter and 
eliminate the use of affirmative action 
altogether.  Justice Clarence Thomas – who 
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in his autobiography blamed affirmative 
action for his problems finding a job after he 
graduated from Yale Law School in the 
1970s – shared that view, but he opted to 
discuss his reasoning at length, in a twenty-
page concurring opinion in which he 
suggested (among other things) that “the 
arguments advanced by the University in 
defense of discrimination are the same as 
those advanced by the segregationists.” 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the lone 
dissenter, but she still managed to produce a 
few zingers of her own in her sparse four-
page opinion.  Most notably, she pooh-
poohed the idea that the two alternatives to 
affirmative action suggested by Fisher and 
her lawyers – the school’s Top Ten Percent 
Plan, which offers automatic admission to 
any Texas high school student in the top ten 
percent of her class, and the review of 
applications without regard to race – are in 
fact “race-blind.”  Because race was actually 
at the heart of the Top Ten Percent Plan, she 
suggests, and because universities will still 
consider race even if they need to do so 
covertly, “only an ostrich could regard the 
supposedly race neutral alternatives as race 
unconscious.” 
How will the university’s policy fare in the 
lower courts?  Given the Top Ten Percent 
Plan’s success in achieving a diverse student 
body, the school could face an uphill battle in 
convincing the lower court that it needs to be 
able to consider race to fill the remaining 
slots.   And it may soon have lots of company 
in court, if today’s ruling leads to new 
lawsuits by spurned applicants at other 
schools. 
Given how long it took the Court to decide 
this case (nearly nine months), the seven-to-
one vote came as somewhat of a 
surprise.  Although it may be many years 
before we know for sure, it seems very 
possible that the end result was a compromise 
brokered to break a stalemate:  affirmative 
action survives at least in theory (which 
would gain the support of Justices Breyer and 
Sotomayor), but will be far more difficult to 
implement in practice (which would gain the 
support of the Court’s more conservative 
Justices).   But for now, and probably much 
to their relief, affirmative action is off the 
Justices’ plate – at least until fall, when they 
will hear oral arguments in a case challenging 
an amendment to the Michigan constitution 
that prohibits the use of affirmative action by 
public universities.  Stay tuned . . . we’ll be 
back to cover that one in Plain English too. 
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“Easy AA” 
Slate 
Jamelle Bouie 
June 29, 2015 
 
In 2008, Abigail Fisher, who is white, sued 
the University of Texas at Austin for race 
discrimination. The school rejected her, and 
she blamed its affirmative action program, 
which considers race and ethnicity in a 
“holistic review” of certain candidates. 
“There were people in my class with lower 
grades who weren’t in all the activities I was 
in, who were being accepted into UT, and the 
only other difference between us was the 
color of our skin,” she explained. 
 
Her rhetoric aside, however, Fisher and her 
lawyers couldn’t prove discrimination in 
court. In 2009, a federal district court upheld 
the university’s policy and rejected her 
lawsuit. She appealed the decision to the 5th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld 
the prior ruling. In a last grasp for success, 
her lawyers appealed their case to the 
Supreme Court, which—in a 7–1 decision—
vacated the previous ruling and sent it back 
to the 5th Circuit for a second hearing. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy explained that the university hadn’t 
proved “its admissions program [was] 
narrowly tailored to obtain the educational 
benefits of diversity.” Everyone had to try 
again. 
 
That was 2013. The 5th Circuit returned to 
the question, and last year it came to the same 
place: UT’s policy was constitutionally 
kosher. “It is equally settled that universities 
may use race as part of a holistic admissions 
program where it cannot otherwise achieve 
diversity,” wrote the 2–1 majority. 
Undeterred, Fisher appealed to the Supreme 
Court again. And on Monday, the Supreme 
Court took her case, again. 
 
What’s striking about this case—and what 
makes it frustrating to some observers—is 
the curious question of Fisher’s academic 
record. Put simply, as Nikole Hannah-Jones 
documented for ProPublica, affirmative 
action wasn’t her problem. 
 
If you want entrance to UT Austin and you 
live in Texas, you have three options: You 
can score in the top 10 percent of your high 
school class, which grants you automatic 
entry; you can try for the non–top 10 slots; or, 
if your grades are weak, you can attend a 
satellite campus and transfer, provided good 
grades and a strong course load. 
 
When Fisher applied in 2008, notes Hannah-
Jones, the UT Austin filled 92 percent of its 
in-state spots with students from the top 10 
program. She wasn’t among them. With a 
3.59 grade-point average and a modest SAT 
score of 1180 out of 1600, she was a solid 
student but not a great one, not for a school 
with an overall acceptance rate of 40 percent 
and an extremely low acceptance rate 
(comparable to Harvard’s) for in-state 
students admitted outside of top 10. 
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For the remaining 8 percent of in-state spots, 
UT Austin used a comprehensive approach 
that weighed grades and test scores along 
with essays, leadership, activities, service to 
the community, and “special circumstances.” 
Those ranged from socioeconomic status and 
school quality, to family background and 
race. As the university’s director of 
admissions explained for the 5th Circuit, 
“[R]ace provides—like language, whether or 
not someone is the first in their family to 
attend college, and family responsibilities—
important context in which to evaluate 
applicants, and is only one aspect of the 
diversity that the University seeks to attain.” 
 
Neither special circumstances nor grades 
were determinative. Of the 841 students 
admitted under these criteria, 47 had worse 
AI/PAI scores (a combination of the holistic 
measure, grades, and test scores) than Fisher, 
and 42 of them were white. On the other end, 
UT rejected 168 black and Latino students 
with scores equal to or better than Fisher’s.* 
 
To call this discrimination is to say that 
Fisher was entitled to a space at the UT 
Austin, despite grades that didn’t make the 
cut. It’s worth pointing out that the university 
gave her the choice of transferring from a 
satellite school, which she rejected. 
 
Fortunately for Fisher, this latest trip to the 
high court might be the try that sticks. At least 
four Supreme Court justices believe 
affirmative action is unconstitutional. In his 
concurrence to the first Fisher opinion, for 
instance, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “The 
Constitution proscribes government 
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-
provided education is no exception.” 
Likewise, on the same grounds, Justice 
Clarence Thomas attacked affirmative action 
as morally equivalent to Jim Crow. Justice 
Samuel Alito has sided with affirmative 
action opponents in the past, and in reference 
to a voluntary school desegregation plan—
which he struck down—Chief Justice John 
Roberts has said that “the way to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race,” as if race 
consciousness is the same as racism. 
Meanwhile, a member of the court’s liberal 
wing, Justice Elena Kagan, will recuse 
herself from hearing the case because she 
worked on it when she was solicitor general. 
 
Given all this, most liberals aren’t optimistic. 
With that said, there’s an argument—from 
Richard Kahlenberg of the Century 
Foundation—that an end to race-based 
affirmative action will spur the country 
toward class-based affirmative action, which 
would assist poor and working-class students 
of all backgrounds, who are underrepresented 
at selective colleges. Because of disparities of 
wealth and income, minorities are as likely as 
whites to benefit under a class-based 
arrangement. 
 
On that score, Texas—with its top 10 
program—is a pioneer. Top 10 doesn’t adjust 
for neighborhood or school quality; the best 
student at an older, rural school is just as 
qualified for admission as the best student at 
a gleaming, suburban complex. With that 
said, Top 10 comes with two serious 
problems: Highly qualified students at great 
schools miss the cutoff, on account of high 
competition, while the best students from 
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low-achieving schools are often unprepared 
for university work. Indeed, there’s a certain 
perversity to top 10, which achieves its racial 
diversity by leveraging neighborhood—and 
thus public high school—segregation. But, 
under a legal regime that only tolerates a 
“narrow” use of racial preferences in 
education—forcing race-neutral means for 
race-conscious ends—that outcome is 
inevitable. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
wrote in her Fisher dissent, “I have said 
before and reiterate here that only an ostrich 
could regard the supposedly neutral 
alternatives as race unconscious.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, it’s worth repeating a point from the 
Economic Policy Institute’s Richard 
Rothstein, who notes—correctly—that 
“black families and their children suffer from 
compounded and inherited disadvantages 
that are unique, not like those of white or 
immigrant families who happen to be from 
lower social classes or who happen to live in 
low-income neighborhoods.” Race 
disadvantage is different than its class 
counterpart, and one affirmative action isn’t 
a substitute for the other. 
 
But even if it were, it’s important to note that 
if the court ends race-based affirmative 
action, there’s no guarantee that we’ll see an 
alternative. Opponents of race-conscious 
policy in education are often opponents of 
“diversity” writ large and won’t be fooled 
into accepting measures to help boost 
diversity by the use of the word class instead 
of race. 
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“Looming Supreme Court Battle Could be a Major Blow to 
Affirmative Action” 
Business Insider 
Peter Jacobs 
June 29, 2015 
The Supreme Court announced Monday that 
justices would reconsider a case on the use of 
race in Texas college admissions that they 
originally heard in 2013. 
The case — Fisher v. University of Texas — 
could provide a significant challenge to 
affirmative action policies because the court's 
key swing voter, Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
has never voted to uphold an affirmative 
action program. 
The justices also seemed primed to rule 
against affirmative action the last time they 
heard the case, even though they sent it back 
to a lower court. 
The dispute centers around Abigail Fisher, a 
white woman in her mid-20s, who in 2008 
sued the University of Texas at Austin after 
she was denied admission to the state's 
flagship public university. 
She claims she was discriminated against 
because of her race, and that UT Austin 
accepted non-white students with worse 
grades and fewer extracurricular activities. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has held 
colleges have the ability to include race as a 
factor in admissions decisions. The key 
decision that seems to influence how the 
justices will approach Fisher's case is Grutter 
v. Bollinger, a 2003 ruling finding the 
University of Michigan Law School could 
use race as part of a "holistic" admissions 
standard. 
The makeup of the Supreme Court has 
changed since the Grutter decision, though. 
Perhaps most notably, former Justice Sandra 
Day O'Conner — who wrote the 5-4 decision 
allowing affirmative action in 2003 — retired 
and was replaced by Justice Samuel A. Alito 
Jr. 
"Her replacement by Justice [Alito], who has 
been hostile to affirmative action programs, 
may have altered the balance on the court on 
whether such admissions programs are 
constitutional," The New York Times 
reported in 2012. 
After hearing arguments in the Fisher case 
that year, The Times reported, "it seemed 
tolerably clear that the four members of the 
court's conservative wing" — Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr., as well as Justices 
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Alito 
— "were ready to act now to revise the 
Grutter decision." 
Kennedy also seemed "prepared to limit the 
Grutter decision," according to The Times, 
while the court's more liberal Justices — 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, 
and Sonia Sotomayor — all seemed to 
support the University of Texas. Justice 
Elena Kagan, who likely worked the case as 
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the US government's Solicitor General, has 
recused herself from hearing Fisher, as she 
did when the court last considered it. 
The Supreme Court eventually decided 7-1 to 
send Fisher v. University of Texas back to a 
lower court to rehear the case with stricter 
scrutiny. Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing 
that Texas was acting appropriately, while 
the other majority opinion held the lower 
court did not examine the necessity of UT 
Austin's affirmative action policy closely 
enough. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
Texas' policy in a 2-1 panel decision, and 
dismissed Fisher's case last year. 
Legal journalist Joan Biskupic's recent book 
on Justice Sonia Sotomayor — "Breaking In: 
The Rise of Sonia Sotomayor and the Politics 
of Justice" — revealed that the 7-1 decision 
was actually a compromise and the court was 
ready to rule against the University of Texas. 
In a New York Times op-ed earlier this year, 
Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse 
highlighted Biskupic book in terms of what it 
might mean if justices again took up Fisher 
v. University of Texas. 
 
"In the University of Texas case, it initially 
looked like a 5-3 lineup. The five 
conservatives, including Justice Kennedy, 
wanted to rule against the Texas policy and 
limit the ability of other universities to use the 
kinds of admissions programs upheld in 
Grutter v. Bollinger. The three liberals were 
ready to dissent," Biskupic writes. 
 
It's not clear that much has changed in the 
past few years. Noting the Supreme Court 
needs four votes to decide to hear a case, 
Greenhouse writes, it’s likely the 
conservative justices "have persuaded 
themselves that Justice Kennedy will hold 
firm rather than seek another temperature-
lowering compromise — and that the ensuing 
heat would be an institutional price worth 
paying." 
 
To some extent the Texas case is unique, as 
public high school students in the top 10% of 
their class are automatically offered 
admissions to UT Austin, although high-
performing students can still gain admission 
through the regular application process, 
which considers factors such as race and 
ethnicity. 
 
In her lawsuit, Fisher and her lawyers argued 
that the "Top Ten" program naturally assures 
enough student diversity that affirmative 
action is not needed, Scott Jaschik points out 
at Inside Higher Ed. 
 
A ruling against the program, however, could 
have a wide-reaching impact on current 
affirmative action policies, as well as future 
cases heard by the Supreme Court. 
 
Affirmative action advocates do have at least 
one avenue to keep Texas' race-inclusive 
policy alive. If Kennedy does surprise and 
switches his vote this time around, the court 
could face a rare 4-4 tie, as Kagan has recused 
herself. In this situation, the Supreme Court's 
ruling would revert back to the lower court, 
which most recently upheld the Texas 
program. 
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Foster v. Humphrey 
14-8349 
Ruling Below: Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736 (Ga. 1988) 
Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, Floyd County, John A. Frazier, Jr., J., of malice 
murder and sentenced to death, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Marshall, C.J., held that: (1) 
a prospective juror's views against the death penalty supported a finding that she was disqualified, 
even though she stated that “maybe” she could change her mind; (2) a prospective juror's confusion 
about the automatic imposition of the death penalty, and his opinion that the police had “probably 
got the right man” when they arrested defendant, did not warrant disqualification; (3) the 
prosecutor successfully rebutted a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges 
Question Presented: Whether the Georgia courts erred in failing to recognize race 
discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky in the extraordinary circumstances of this death penalty 
case. 
 
Timothy Tyrone FOSTER 
Appellant 
v. 
The STATE 
Appellee 
Supreme Court of Georgia 
Decided on November 22, 1988 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
MARSHALL, Chief Justice. 
This is a death-penalty case. Queen Madge 
White, a 79–year–old widow, lived by herself 
in Rome, Georgia. Early in the evening of 
August 27, 1986, a friend took White to choir 
practice, and brought her home at 8:30 p.m. 
White talked to her sister by telephone at 9:00 
p.m. and everything was normal. However, 
when the sister stopped by early the next 
morning, she discovered that White's house 
had been broken into and ransacked. The 
sister called the police, who found White's 
body lying on the floor in her bedroom 
covered to her chin by a blanket. Her face was 
coated with talcum powder. Her jaw was 
broken. She had a severe gash on the top of 
her head. She had been sexually molested 
with a salad-dressing bottle, and strangled to 
death. A number of her possessions were 
missing from her home. 
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The appellant, Timothy Tyrone Foster, was 
arrested for White's murder a month later 
when he threatened his live-in companion 
and she responded by turning him in. The 
victim's possessions were recovered from 
their home and from Foster's two sisters. 
Foster was interrogated and confessed. A jury 
convicted him of malice murder and 
burglary, and sentenced him to death. This is 
his appeal. 
The crime occurred August 27, 1986. Foster 
was arrested September 26 and indicted on 
October 17, 1986. The case was tried April 
20 through May 1, 1987. A motion for new 
trial was filed May 28, 1987 and heard 
November 24, 1987. The trial court denied 
the motion on February 3, 1988. A notice of 
appeal was filed March 3, 1988, and the case 
was docketed in this court on March 21, 
1988. Oral arguments were heard June 6, 
1988. 
1.  
Foster first contends the trial court erred by 
excusing one prospective juror and by failing 
to excuse eight prospective jurors. 
Prospective juror Black was excused because 
of her views against capital punishment. The 
test for excusal is “whether the juror's views 
[on capital punishment] would ‘prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his 
duties as a juror in accordance with his 
instructions and his oath.’ ”  
Black's answers to questions about the death 
penalty, like those of many other prospective 
jurors, were somewhat contradictory. As she 
pointed out, she had never before been asked 
to express her views on capital punishment. 
She did state, however, that, although she 
“maybe” could change her mind, she was 
opposed to the death penalty, and she stated 
repeatedly that she would automatically vote 
for a life sentence in a murder case. The trial 
court's finding that she was disqualified is not 
clearly erroneous. 
We note that Black gave inconsistent answers 
to several attempts to ask a question in the 
exact language of the Witt test for excusal. 
Although the standard enunciated in Witt is 
the test for excusal, it is not necessarily the 
best or most comprehensible voir dire 
question. As is noted in Witt: “Relevant voir 
dire questions addressed to this issue [of 
death-qualification] need not be framed 
exclusively in the language of the controlling 
appellate opinion; the opinion is, after all, an 
opinion and not an intricate devise in a will.”  
Foster contends that prospective juror 
Tate should have been excused because he 
initially stated that he would vote 
automatically to impose a death sentence if 
the defendant were convicted, and because he 
had formed an opinion that the police had 
“probably got the right man” when they 
arrested Foster. However, it is clear that Tate 
was confused at first by the question about 
the automatic imposition of the death penalty. 
Further questioning cleared up the confusion 
and showed no disqualification in this 
respect. The previously-formed opinion as to 
guilt was not so “fixed and definite” as to 
necessitate an excusal for cause. Tate stated 
repeatedly that he could set aside his opinion, 
and decide the case strictly on the evidence.  
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Tate was not alone. Many of the prospective 
jurors stated at first that they would vote 
automatically for both a death sentence and a 
life sentence. 
Foster also contends that prospective juror 
Holder should have been excused for his 
views on the death penalty. Any death-
qualification issue here is moot, since this 
prospective juror was excused on other 
grounds. 
Foster complains of the refusal to excuse six 
additional prospective jurors on the ground of 
bias. Some of these prospective jurors knew 
the victim, but none were close to her, and 
they all testified that they could be fair and 
impartial jurors and could decide the case on 
the evidence presented. The trial court did not 
err by overruling Foster's challenges for 
favor.  
2.  
The voir dire examination concluded on a 
Friday afternoon. The jury was selected 
Monday morning, giving the parties the 
weekend to plan their peremptory challenges. 
The qualified panel from which the jury was 
selected included four blacks. The district 
attorney exercised peremptory challenges 
against each of the four black jurors. Foster 
timely raised an issue of racial discrimination 
in the prosecution's exercise of peremptory 
challenges. The trial court ruled that a prima 
facie case had been established, and required 
the prosecutor to explain his exercise of 
peremptory challenges. See Gamble v. State. 
Foster contends the trial court erred by 
finding that the state successfully rebutted the 
prima facie case. As we stated in Gamble 
(quoting from Batson): 
The [prosecutor's] explanation [of his 
peremptory challenges] “need not rise 
to the level justifying exercise of a 
challenge for cause,” but it must be 
“neutral,” “related to the case to be 
tried,” and a “‘clear and reasonably 
specific,’ explanation of his 
‘legitimate reasons' for exercising the 
challenges.” 
 
The defense in this case centered around 
Foster's deprived background and his use of 
drugs and alcohol. Many of the defendant's 
witnesses were social workers. Part of his 
defense was that when he was a juvenile he 
had not been committed to a Youth 
Development Center for the commission of 
armed robbery, notwithstanding the 
contemporaneous recommendation of a 
psychiatrist that only incarceration and strict 
discipline could possibly have any “lasting 
impact” on his anti-social behavior. Instead, 
he was returned by the state to an unsuitable 
and harmful family environment which 
included heavy drug use by his own parents 
and a girlfriend who “sold [her] body” for 
cocaine. Foster contended he was mentally ill 
and, further, that he was involuntarily 
intoxicated by alcohol, marijuana and 
cocaine. 
The prosecutor was familiar with Foster's 
background and knew that Foster intended to 
assert a defense involving mental illness and 
drug usage. He explained his challenges of 
the four black prospective jurors as follows, 
taking them in the order in which they 
underwent voir dire: 
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The first juror has a son the same age as the 
defendant who has been convicted of a 
misdemeanor theft offense. His wife works at 
the Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital, a 
mental health facility. His brother was once a 
drug consultant. During the Witherspoon 
questioning, the juror appeared to be 
reluctant to say that he could vote for a death 
sentence, and he is a member of a church 
whose members, in the experience of the 
prosecutor, tend to be very reluctant to 
impose the death penalty. 
The defendant concedes the prosecutor was 
justified in striking the second juror, who, 
among other things, had talked to the 
defendant's mother before entering the 
courtroom. 
The third juror claimed to be the halfsister of 
the district attorney's chief investigator (who 
is black). The investigator, however, denied 
being related in any way to this juror. 
Moreover, the juror denied having a friend or 
relative accused or convicted of a crime of 
violence and denied knowing anyone with a 
drug or alcohol problem notwithstanding that 
her brother is a repeat offender whose crimes 
involve theft by taking, burglary and drugs, 
and that her husband has been convicted for 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
The fourth juror is a social worker involved 
with low-income, underprivileged children. 
Her first cousin was arrested by the Metro 
Drug Task force on serious drug charges and 
the cousin lost her job as a consequence. 
The prosecutor explained that he did not want 
social workers on the jury in a death penalty 
case, as they tended to sympathize with 
criminal defendants, especially at the penalty 
phase. Moreover he preferred not to allow on 
the jury anyone who was closely related to 
someone with a drug or alcohol problem, 
since the defendant in this case planned to 
blame the crime on his own drug and alcohol 
problem. He further stated that he could not 
trust someone who gave materially untruthful 
answers on voir dire, as did the third juror. 
Finally, he was prepared to challenge 
peremptorily any juror who was reluctant to 
impose the death penalty as a matter of 
conscience where the juror's opposition to the 
death penalty did not rise to the level 
justifying a disqualification for cause.  
The prosecutor's explanations were related to 
the case to be tried, and were clear and 
reasonably specific. The trial court did not err 
by finding them to be sufficiently neutral and 
legitimate. The court's determination that the 
prosecutor successfully rebutted the prima 
facie case is entitled to “great deference,” and 
is not clearly erroneous in this case. 
3.  
There was no abuse of discretion in the 
court's conduct of the week-long voir dire 
examination of prospective jurors. 
4.  
The trial court did not err by denying Foster's 
post-trial motion to review in camera the 
state's jury-selection notes. An attorney's 
work product is generally non-discoverable. 
A defendant's right to exculpatory evidence 
under Brady v. Maryland, is not involved 
here, and nonexculpatory information in an 
attorney's work product does not become 
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discoverable simply because the opposing 
attorneys might find it strategically useful. 
5.  
There was no error in the trial court's denial 
of funds for expert assistance to examine 
fingerprints, shoe prints and blood spatters.  
6.  
The evidence presented by the defendant in 
support of his motion for change of venue 
does not show such an inundation of pretrial 
publicity as would give rise to a presumption 
of prejudice. The voir dire examination and 
qualification of prospective jurors support the 
trial court's determination that a change of 
venue was unnecessary.  
7.  
On the day the crime was discovered, an 
investigator equipped with a video camera 
filmed the crime scene. The resulting 
videotape depicts the exterior of the victim's 
home (including the window through which 
the defendant entered), the path which he 
apparently took from the house (dropping 
things along the way and leaving footprints), 
the interior of the victim's home (and the 
extent to which it had been ransacked), and, 
finally, the victim's body (before and after the 
removal of the blanket covering her). 
The trial court overruled Foster's objection 
that the videotape was inflammatory and 
duplicative of the still photographs of the 
scene and of the body which the state also 
introduced in evidence. The videotape clearly 
was relevant. There was no abuse of 
discretion in the court's ruling.  
8.  
Foster was interrogated by the police on the 
afternoon of the day he was arrested. Mike 
Reynolds, the lead investigator, testified it 
was “the first time I had ever talked with 
[Foster] ... [and] I really didn't expect a 
confession, [so] I didn't turn any of the video 
equipment on.” However, after being advised 
of his rights, Foster confessed. Reynolds 
“didn't want to stop him ... to go turn 
everything on,” so he let him confess, and this 
first confession was not recorded. 
Reynolds showed Foster the crime scene 
photographs. Foster denied raping the victim, 
but admitted molesting her with a salad-
dressing bottle. Foster stated that he took the 
air-conditioner out of one of the bedroom 
windows, set it on the ground, and entered the 
house. He found some suitcases and began 
filling them. He found two pocketbooks and 
searched them for valuables. The victim 
woke up and went to the bathroom, without 
turning on any lights. Then, Foster stated, she 
returned to her bedroom and, turning on the 
lamp by her bed, saw the defendant for the 
first time, in the living room. She came into 
the living room armed with a knife, and 
chased Foster around the living room chair. 
He got a piece of wood from beside the 
fireplace and hit her on the head. After being 
hit, she ran to the bedroom and fell to the 
floor. Foster denied strangling the victim, 
claiming that he had merely wrapped a sheet 
around her neck. He admitted dumping white 
powder on her, “because it cools the body 
off.” He could not explain why he “stuck” the 
salad-dressing bottle “up her,” but he covered 
her body with a blanket so he would not have 
to look at her.  He left by the back door, and 
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hid what he had taken in a nearby empty 
house until he could return for it the next day. 
After giving the above statement, Reynolds 
tried to persuade Foster to confess a second 
time with the video recording equipment 
turned on. Reynolds testified Foster “was a 
little hesitant about confessing a second 
time.” He and detective Craft spent “eight or 
nine minutes ... trying to talk him into 
confessing to us a second time.” Foster 
expressed concern that he might not say 
exactly the same thing the second time. The 
officers assured him that they were not trying 
to “trap” or “trick” him, and that “it would be 
better just to put it on tape ... and it will be 
correct.” The interview continued: 
Craft: Just tell us again on tape one 
more time. It ain't going to hurt 
nothing. 
Foster: Why can't we just leave it at 
that? 
Reynolds: If ... you want to leave it at 
this and not put it on tape, that is fine 
with me.... Let's just leave it. What 
this means is that Wayne and I are 
going to have to sit up all night long 
and write about you. 
Craft: Yeah. But if we put it on tape 
can't nobody change what the tape 
says, you know. Okay? This is—this 
is as much for your benefit as it is ours 
... so let's just go through it right quick 
one more time and get it over with ... 
Okay? 
Reynolds: Tim, I haven't lied to you 
through the whole night, and I haven't 
tried to trick you through the whole 
night, and I am not trying now.... 
[Y]ou [sat] in here and told two police 
officers everything about it.... I am 
not trying to push you or bluff you or 
anything. It will just make it a lot 
easier on all of us. 
Craft: Tim, let's go ahead and get this 
thing over with tonight. You told us 
about it already one time. Okay? Hey, 
let's run back through it right quick 
and get it over with and be done with 
it. Okay? ... Do you want to do that? 
It ain't going to hurt, not a thing. 
Craft: [Y]ou told us about it one time 
already. It ain't going to hurt, you 
know. I mean I think you will agree 
that it ain't going to hurt, you know, 
for us to run back through it again 
right quick.... 
Thus encouraged, Foster was interviewed a 
second time on videotape. His second 
confession was identical in all material 
respects with the first. 
(a) Foster contends first that his confessions 
were induced by a “hope of benefit,” because 
he was informed that he would not be charged 
with rape. There is no merit to this 
contention. Foster was simply told that no 
rape would be charged, based on his 
statement that no rape occurred. No benefit 
was offered to induce a confession. 
(b) Foster contends further that it was error to 
admit the second statement in evidence 
because it was elicited only after he was told 
repeatedly that it was not going to hurt “a 
thing,” and that it would be “as much for your 
benefit as ours.” We agree. An accused must 
be warned that anything he says can and will 
be used against him in court.  Telling him that 
a confession is not going to hurt and, on the 
contrary, will benefit him as much as the 
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police, is not consistent with the warnings 
required by Miranda. 
Nevertheless, there is no reversible error. The 
videotaped confession was merely 
cumulative to the first, non-recorded 
confession, and that confession and the 
remaining evidence overwhelmingly 
establish Foster's guilt. Any error here is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
9.  
A defense psychiatrist testified that Foster 
was so intoxicated from the ingestion of 
alcohol, marijuana and cocaine that he did not 
know the difference between right and wrong 
at the time of the crime. He also testified that 
Foster has an anti-social personality disorder, 
but that when he is sober he is neither insane 
nor mentally ill under Georgia law. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked 
the psychiatrist if it was true that most people 
in prison have an anti-social personality 
disorder. The psychiatrist agreed that it was 
true. Then the state asked: 
So any one of those people that took 
cocaine and marijuana and beer in the 
quantities by his story that you say 
that this defendant took it, would be 
entitled to walk out of the courtroom 
as found acquitted on the basis of 
insanity. Is that what you're saying? 
Foster objected and moved for a mistrial. The 
trial court denied the mistrial, but sustained 
the objection and instructed the jury to 
disregard the question. The court did not err 
by refusing to declare a mistrial. 
10.  
The court charged on voluntary and 
involuntary intoxication as follows: 
Our law provides that voluntary intoxication 
shall not be an excuse for any criminal act. It 
provides further that if a person's mind when 
unexcited by intoxicants is capable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong and 
reason and acting rationally, and he 
voluntarily deprives himself of reason by 
consuming intoxicants and while under the 
influence of such intoxicants, he commits a 
criminal act, he is criminally responsible for 
such act to the same extent as if he were 
sober. Whether or not the defendant was 
voluntarily intoxicated at or during the time 
alleged in this indictment is a matter solely 
for you, the jury, to determine. 
A person shall not be found guilty of a 
crime when, at the time of the conduct 
constituting the crime, the person, because of 
involuntary intoxication, did not have 
sufficient mental capacity to distinguish 
between right and wrong in relation to the 
criminal act. 
Involuntary intoxication means intoxication 
caused by (a) consumption of a substance 
through excusable ignorance, or (b) the 
coercion, fraud, artifice or contrivance of 
another person. 
These instructions set forth the principles 
contained in OCGA § 16–3–4. 
Foster contends the court erred by refusing 
his request to charge in addition: 
 239 
If, because of the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or narcotics, one's mind becomes so impaired 
as to render him incapable of forming an 
intent to do the act charged, or to understand 
that a certain consequence would likely result 
from it, he would not be criminally 
responsible for the act. 
The law of intoxication contained in OCGA 
§ 16–3–4 must be read in light of OCGA 
§16–3–2, which provides: 
A person shall not be found guilty of 
a crime if, at the time of the act, 
omission, or negligence constituting 
the crime, the person did not have 
mental capacity to distinguish 
between right and wrong in relation to 
such act, omission or negligence. 
OCGA § 16–3–4 limits the reach of OCGA 
§16–3–2 so that the inability to distinguish 
between right and wrong is not a defense if 
the inability is a consequence of voluntary 
intoxication (but remains a defense if the 
inability is a consequence of involuntary 
intoxication). 
Neither code section speaks of an inability to 
form an intent to commit the act. Persons are 
not excused from criminal liability under 
either of these code sections because they are 
incapable of forming criminal intent. As we 
observed in Pope v. State, a person can be 
capable of forming an intent to kill but 
incapable of understanding the difference 
between right and wrong. Lack of intent is a 
defense, but it is not implicated by either 
OCGA § 16–3–2 or OCGA § 16–3–4. In 
Jones v. State, this court explained: 
Foster's own psychiatrist testified that 
although Foster was incapable of 
distinguishing between right and 
wrong at the time of the crime, he was 
capable of forming the intent to do the 
acts he committed. 
[T]he minimum of mind which can furnish 
the necessary mental element in crime, is a 
far smaller quantity than was claimed by the 
argument for the accused.... 
Whoever ... has mind enough to form the 
simple intention to kill a human being, has 
mind enough to have malice, and to furnish 
the mental constituents of murder.... 
And this brings [us] to a consideration of the 
great perversions which have been made of 
the doctrine that drunkenness is no excuse for 
crime. The foundation stone of these 
perversions, not distinctly shaped in the 
argument, but unconsciously assumed in it, is 
a feeling or notion that the exemption of 
insane persons and young children from 
criminal responsibility, is not the result of 
positive law excusing them, but is the simple 
consequence of their mental deficiency, 
which is supposed to be so complete as not to 
be capable of furnishing the mental element 
of crime; while the drunken man, with the 
same actual mental deficiency, is held 
responsible for his actions, not because they 
are crimes having the mental and physical 
element of crime, but by virtue of a certain 
destructive capacity infused into him, from 
reasons of policy, by the law which declares 
that drunkenness shall be no excuse for 
crime. The reverse of all this is the true 
philosophy of the law. The law deals with all 
of these classes of people, as having a 
sufficient quantum of mind to have bad 
passions, and evil intentions, and 
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carelessness in their actions, and so to furnish 
the mental element of crime, but as laboring 
also under an infirmity of reason, which 
serves to betray them into these evil 
intentions and carelessness, and at the same 
time breaks down this power of resisting 
temptation. The law comes in then, and 
excuses the young and the insane, out of 
tenderness towards an infirmity which is 
involuntary, and at the same time, to guard 
against the possibility that men might make 
the same excuse whenever there is the same 
infirmity of reason, the law takes special care 
to exclude drunken men from the excuse, 
because their infirmity is voluntary. 
The result is, that the young and the 
involuntarily insane occupy a platform of 
their own, by virtue of an exception made in 
their favor, while the voluntary insanity of 
drunkenness being excluded from the 
exception, stands just as if no exception had 
been made, and the drunk man and sober man 
occupy the same great platform of 
responsibility for the crimes which they 
commit.... 
Foster's requested charge is misleading, 
because it implies that the intoxication 
defense involves a lack of intent to commit 
the crime, when intent is, in fact, a separate 
issue. 
The trial court charged on intent, including 
the state's burden to prove intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The court did not err by 
refusing to give in addition the defendant's 
requested charge on inability to form intent 
as a result of intoxication. 
11.  
“The statutory provision that ... mental illness 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
constitutionally infirm.  
12.  
The state urged the presence of two statutory 
aggravating circumstances at the sentencing 
phase of the trial: (1) the murder was 
committed while the offender was engaged in 
the commission of burglary, and (2) the 
murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated 
battery to the victim. The court's charge 
included an instruction that if the jury should 
find the § b(7) circumstance, its verdict 
should specify which of the three elements of 
§ b(7)—torture, depravity of mind, or an 
aggravated battery—the jury found.  
A type-written verdict form was submitted to 
the jury as follows: 
The following aggravated 
circumstances as to Murder has [sic] 
been submitted by the State of 
Georgia and must have been proved 
to the satisfaction of the jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt before a verdict 
recommending the death penalty is 
authorized, to wit. 
1. The offense of murder was 
committed while the offender was 
engaged in the commission of 
Burglary. 
2. The offense of murder was 
outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible, or inhuman in that it 
involved torture, depravity of mind or 
an aggravated battery to the victim. 
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The jury will answer the following 
questions: 
1. Did you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt the aggravated circumstances 
to exist as to the murder? 
2. If so, write the aggravated 
circumstances below as to murder. 
3. As to murder: (A) We the jury 
recommend the death penalty. YES ( 
) NO () 
B. We the jury recommend Life 
Imprisonment. YES ( ) NO ( ) 
The jury filled in the form by writing “yes” 
after the first question, and by writing after 
the second question: 
Torture—powdered body, eyes & 
nose, salad bottle in vagina, 
strangulation 
Depravity of mind—powdered body, 
salad bottle in vagina, strangulation 
Aggravated battery—hit with stick 
(log) disfigured face, strangulation 
Finally, the jury checked “yes” to 3(A) and 
drew a line through 3(B). 
The jury convicted Foster of burglary and 
answered “yes” to the question whether it had 
found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
proffered “aggravated circumstances”, one of 
which was burglary. However, the jury failed 
to list burglary in the space provided under 
the second “question”. Although it is likely 
that the jury meant to find that the 
commission of the offense of burglary was a 
statutory aggravating circumstance of the 
murder, we cannot be sure that the jury 
intended to do so, and we shall not consider 
burglary as a statutory circumstance 
supporting the imposition of a death 
sentence.  
That leaves the § b(7) circumstance. Since no 
one at trial objected to the form of the verdict, 
the question here is not whether the form of 
the verdict might be objectionable, but 
whether “the jury's intent [was] shown with 
sufficient clarity that this court can rationally 
review the jury's finding.”  We are satisfied 
that the jury intended to find the § b(7) 
circumstance in its entirety and to follow the 
trial court's instructions by specifying in 
particular that it had found each of the three 
principal elements of § b(7). 
The evidence showed that Foster hit the 
victim with a fireplace log hard enough to 
break her jaw, sexually molested her, poured 
talcum powder all 
over her face, and then strangled her to death. 
The jury's § b(7) finding is supported by the 
evidence. 
13.  
The death sentence was not imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejudice or other 
arbitrary factor, and is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases, considering both the crime and 
the defendant. OCGA § 17–10–35(c)(1) and 
(c)(3). The similar cases listed in the 
Appendix support the imposition of a death 
sentence in this case. 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
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“High Court to Consider Appeal over Exclusion of Black Jurors” 
Associated Press 
May 26, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court will consider whether 
prosecutors improperly singled out potential 
black jurors in notes and then excluded them 
all from the death penalty trial of a black 
Georgia man accused of murder. 
The justices agreed Tuesday to hear an appeal 
from Timothy Foster, who was sentenced to 
death in 1987 after being convicted of 
murdering a 79-year-old white woman in 
Rome, Georgia. 
Lawyers for Foster are relying on 
prosecutors' notes they discovered 19 years 
after the trial through an open records 
request. 
The notes show that the name of each 
potential black juror was highlighted on four 
different copies of the jury list and the word 
"black" was circled next to the race question 
on questionnaires for the black prospective 
jurors. Three of the prospective black jurors 
were identified in notes as "B#1," "B#2," and 
"B#3." 
The notes also show that the prosecutors' 
investigator ranked the black prospective 
jurors against each other in case "it comes 
down to having to pick one of the black 
jurors." Prosecutors struck all four black 
jurors out of the 42 qualified by the trial court 
to serve on the jury. 
A Georgia state court sided with prosecutors 
who said they challenged each of the possible 
black jurors for legitimate, race-neutral 
reasons and did not rely on the highlighted 
jury lists to make their ultimate decisions. 
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 
Just one year before Foster's trial, the 
Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 1986 case 
that it is unconstitutional to dismiss a 
potential juror because of race. 
Georgia officials argue that highlighting, 
circling or otherwise noting the race of a juror 
in notes does not show any intent to 
discriminate. The two prosecutors submitted 
an affidavit to the state court saying that 
neither one of them made the green highlight 
marks noting prospective black jurors. 
The state also says the investigator's 
comments were not those of the prosecutors 
and do not indicate the state's intent. 
Foster is being represented by the Southern 
Center for Human Rights, which provides 
free legal help to people facing the death 
penalty and challenges human rights 
violations in prisons and jails. 
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“Why is it So Easy for Prosecutors to Strike Black Jurors?” 
The New Yorker 
Gilad Edelman 
June 5, 2015 
 
Last week, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case of Timothy Tyrone Foster, a black 
man sentenced to death by an all-white 
Georgia jury in 1987 for murdering an elderly 
white woman. Foster claims that the 
prosecution deliberately eliminated all four 
eligible black jurors. The state argues that 
race played no role in jury selection. It’s an 
odd argument in light of the evidence that 
emerged decades after Foster’s conviction: in 
their notes, the prosecutors highlighted the 
black jurors’ names in green; circled the 
answer “black” on the questionnaire where 
jurors had been asked to identify their race; 
labelled three black jurors “B#1,” “B#2,” and 
“B#3”; and identified which person to keep 
“if we had to pick a black juror.” 
 
The Supreme Court may well grant Foster a 
new trial on the grounds that the state violated 
Batson v. Kentucky, a landmark 1986 case in 
which the Court declared it unconstitutional 
to strike potential jurors because of their race. 
But a victory for Foster won’t change the fact 
that, nearly thirty years later, prosecutors 
across the country, and especially in the 
South, continue to get away with 
intentionally striking black people from 
juries in trials of black defendants. The most 
remarkable thing about Batson, it turns out, is 
how easy it has been to ignore. 
 
Jury selection occurs in two steps. First, the 
judge dismisses potential jurors “for cause” if 
they can’t be impartial. Second, after 
questioning the remaining jurors, the defense 
and the prosecution each have a number of 
peremptory strikes (the number varies by 
state) to remove jurors they don’t like until 
twelve are left. The lawyers don’t have to 
give any justification for these strikes, and 
they don’t need the judge’s approval. That 
poses a problem for a legal system that 
forbids racial discrimination: If the 
prosecutor doesn’t have to give a reason, 
what’s to stop him from getting rid of a juror 
because he’s black? 
 
The Supreme Court’s answer in Batson was 
to allow a defendant to force the prosecution 
to explain a strike if it seems to be racially 
motivated. When making a Batson challenge, 
as it soon came to be called, the defense must 
first convince the judge that there is reason to 
suspect that a strike was based on race, 
usually by pointing out the high proportion of 
black jurors being targeted. Next, the 
prosecutor has to give a race-neutral reason 
for striking the juror. Then it’s up to the judge 
to decide whether the reason is legitimate or 
a pretext for a race-based strike. 
 
Justice Thurgood Marshall voted with the 
majority in Batson, but in a concurring 
opinion he warned that its procedure 
wouldn’t really solve the problem of race-
biased jury selection: it would be too easy for 
prosecutors to make up race-neutral reasons 
for striking a juror. 
 
 245 
Marshall’s skepticism was quickly 
vindicated. As soon as Batson was decided, 
prosecutors started coming up with tactics to 
evade it. In a 1987 training video that became 
notorious when it was leaked years later, Jack 
McMahon, an assistant district attorney in 
Philadelphia, told new prosecutors, “When 
you do have a black jury, you question them 
at length. And on this little sheet that you 
have, mark something down that you can 
articulate later. . . . You may want to ask more 
questions of those people so it gives you more 
ammunition to make an articulable reason as 
to why you are striking them, not for race.” 
 
A consensus soon formed that the Batson 
remedy was toothless. In a 1996 opinion, an 
Illinois appellate judge, exasperated by “the 
charade that has become the Batson process,” 
catalogued some of the flimsy reasons for 
striking jurors that judges had accepted as 
“race-neutral”: too old, too young; living 
alone, living with a girlfriend; over-educated, 
lack of maturity; unemployed, employed as a 
barber; and so on. The judge joked, “New 
prosecutors are given a manual, probably 
entitled, ‘Handy Race-Neutral Explanations’ 
or ‘20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral 
Explanations.’” 
 
As it turns out, that really happens. In the 
nineteen-nineties, the North Carolina 
prosecutors’ association held training 
sessions where prosecutors got one-page 
handouts such as “Batson Justifications: 
Articulating Juror Negatives,” which listed 
reasons for striking jurors based on traits like 
age and body language. A similar list 
distributed in 2004 to Texas prosecutors 
included justifications like “Agreed with O. 
J. Simpson verdict” and “Watched gospel TV 
programs.” 
 
Stephen Bright, the president of the Southern 
Center for Human Rights, who is 
representing Foster on its behalf, argued and 
won a Batson appeal at the Supreme Court in 
2008. But Bright, a longtime capital trial and 
appellate lawyer, doesn’t see that victory as a 
vindication of the procedure. 
 
“It just makes such a farce of the system,” he 
said. “Nobody—the judge, the prosecutor, 
the defense lawyers—nobody thinks the 
reasons are really the reasons they strike the 
people. They strike the people because of 
their race. I mean, we all know that. And then 
you try to come up with a good reason for 
doing it and see if you can get away with it.” 
 
“You’re asking the judge to say that the 
prosecutor intentionally discriminated on the 
basis of race, and that he lied about it,” he 
went on. “That’s very difficult 
psychologically for the average judge.” 
 
There are no comprehensive statistics on how 
often prosecutors strike jurors based on race, 
but there is little doubt that the practice 
remains common, especially in the South. In 
Caddo Parish, Louisiana, prosecutors struck 
forty-eight per cent of qualified black jurors 
between 1997 and 2009 and only fourteen per 
cent of qualified whites, according to a 
review by the Louisiana Capital Assistance 
Center. In Jefferson Parish, where a quarter 
of the population is black, the split was even 
greater—fifty-five per cent to sixteen per 
cent—so that twenty-two per cent of felony 
trials between 1994 and 2002 had no black 
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jurors. According to a 2010 report by the 
Equal Justice Initiative documenting 
discrimination in eight Southern states, half 
of all juries that delivered death sentences in 
Houston County, Alabama, between 2005 
and 2009 were all white; the other half had a 
single black juror. Houston County is twenty-
seven per cent black. 
 
In 2012, a North Carolina judge found that in 
capital cases between 1990 and 2010 
prosecutors statewide struck potential black 
jurors at twice the rate of non-blacks.* A 
regression analysis showed that the disparity 
held even when controlling for other factors 
that correlate with race. In a pained opinion, 
the judge concluded, “Race, not reservations 
about the death penalty, not connections to 
the criminal justice system, but race, drives 
prosecution decisions about which citizens 
may participate in one of the most important 
and visible aspects of democratic 
government.” 
 
Why do race-based peremptory challenges 
persist? Because race is an unfortunate but 
powerful basis for generalization. To state the 
obvious, black people are more likely to have 
been targeted or abused by police; to be 
affected by the extreme racial disparities in 
arrests, incarceration, and the death penalty; 
and to understand that crimes against black 
victims are prosecuted less vigorously than 
those against whites. All things being equal, 
a prosecutor has reason to think that a black 
juror is less likely to side with the 
government against a black defendant than a 
white one. (Former prosecutors with whom I 
spoke stressed that attorneys defending black 
clients are just as likely to strike whites in 
order to get more blacks on the jury. The 
Supreme Court has held that defense strikes 
of white jurors also violate Batson.) 
 
Research backs up the common-sense 
intuition that excluding black people from 
juries can influence verdicts. A 2004 study by 
the Capital Jury Project found that in cases 
with a black defendant and a white victim, 
having one or more black male jurors 
drastically lowered the chances of a death 
sentence. Experiments have shown that all-
white mock juries spend less time 
deliberating, make more factual mistakes, 
and are more likely to convict a minority 
defendant than racially diverse juries. These 
studies suggest what some prosecutors have 
long assumed: striking potential black jurors 
raises the odds of a black defendant being 
convicted and increases the penalty he is 
likely to receive. 
 
Even apart from trial outcomes, 
discriminatory strikes distort a basic premise 
of the jury system: the notion that a jury 
represents the whole community. “Maybe the 
most powerful thing that a citizen can do, 
more powerful than voting, is to serve on a 
jury,” Tye Hunter, the former director of the 
Center for Death Penalty Litigation, which 
brought the 2012 North Carolina case, said. 
“And the fact that black people are routinely 
over-excused from that duty is just another 
very public, very significant badge of 
inferiority and second-class citizenship.” 
 
The defense bar celebrated Batson when it 
was decided. Even Justice Marshall, who had 
expressed concerns about its effectiveness, 
applauded the majority for taking “a historic 
 247 
step toward eliminating the shameful practice 
of racial discrimination in the selection of 
juries.” It’s clear today, though, that Batson 
rested on faulty assumptions. The Court 
placed too much faith in trial judges and 
underestimated prosecutors’ motivation to 
circumvent the rule, possibly because it 
refused to recognize that there was any 
rational reason to strike jurors based on race. 
And once it became clear that the Batson test 
wouldn’t do the trick, the Court refused to 
strengthen it. In fact, later decisions did the 
opposite, holding that judges can accept even 
a “silly or superstitious” reason—like a 
lawyer thinking that a prospective juror’s 
mustache is “suspicious”—as long as it 
doesn’t explicitly invoke race. 
 
What should be done? In his Batson 
concurrence, Justice Marshall argued that 
only banning peremptory challenges would 
solve the problem. While that idea has picked 
up support from academics and judges, 
including Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Breyer, it’s a political nonstarter. Most trial 
lawyers, even on the defense side, just don’t 
want to give up their ability to use strikes to 
shape the jury, and they have the clout to 
prevent it from happening. 
 
Richard Bourke, who has worked on Batson 
appeals as the director of the Louisiana 
Capital Assistance Center, suggested that the 
most powerful, realistic reform would be to 
have states track the racial makeup of jury 
selection in the same way they track the racial 
statistics of traffic stops. He has a point. 
Neither courts nor legislatures will think 
seriously about replacing the feeble Batson 
procedure if there aren’t public objections to 
it. But cases like Timothy Tyrone Foster’s, 
where the defense uncovers the prosecution’s 
blatantly racist notes, are rare. Race-based 
peremptory strikes are almost always 
invisible, or at least, as Batson has shown, 
hard to prove. Only when such strikes are 
added up can they be seen. Batson is a 
reminder that a legal system formally blind to 
race is just as often blind to racism.
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“Georgia Justice” 
Slate 
Mark Joseph Stern 
May 27, 2015 
 
The prosecutors seeking to send Timothy 
Tyrone Foster to death row went about their 
job in a curious manner. During jury 
selection, they highlighted each black 
prospective juror’s name in green—on four 
different copies of the jury list—and wrote 
that the green highlighting “represents 
blacks.” On each black juror’s questionnaire, 
prosecutors circled the response “black” next 
to a question about race. They also referred to 
three black jurors as “B#1,” “B#2,” and 
“B#3” in their notes. Finally, the 
prosecution’s investigator ranked each black 
juror against the others—in case “it comes 
down to having to pick one of the black 
jurors.” 
 
The prosecutors struck each black candidate, 
one by one, from the jury pool until none 
remained. 
 
At the end of the trial, prosecutors asked the 
jury to impose the death penalty on Foster, to 
“deter other people out there in the projects.” 
The all-white jury convicted Foster of murder 
and sentenced him to death. 
 
Foster, a black man, appealed his conviction 
to the Georgia Supreme Court. Striking black 
jurors on account of their race is 
unconstitutional, and Foster believed he 
deserved a new trial. But the Georgia 
Supreme Court rejected his claim. 
Prosecutors had not “demonstrated 
purposeful discrimination” in striking black 
jurors, the court held. There was no racial 
bias in the prosecution of Timothy Tyrone 
Foster. His execution could move forward. 
 
On Tuesday, the U.S. Supreme Court 
announced it will review the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s decision. The case, Foster 
v. Humphrey, gives the justices a chance to 
correct a gross miscarriage of justice—the 
insidious racism that so often infects the 
prosecution of black defendants. A victory 
for Foster could put a dent in the kind of 
misconduct that unscrupulous prosecutors 
use to put black defendants behind bars. 
 
A victory for Georgia, however, would be a 
huge setback for the criminal justice system. 
It could give prosecutors across the country 
free rein to employ the kind of warped 
Southern justice that helped send Foster to 
death row.  
 
Black jurors were purportedly struck for 
having sons about Foster’s age, while white 
jurors were welcomed. 
 
The Supreme Court articulated the current 
standard governing jury selection in the 1986 
case Batson v. Kentucky. The court held that 
attorneys for both the prosecution and the 
defense may make a certain number of 
“peremptory challenges”—that is, they can 
strike prospective jurors during voir dire 
without giving a cause. However, prosecutors 
may not strike jurors on account of their race. 
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Such race-based strikes, the court held, 
violate the defendant’s constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection, and undermine 
“public confidence in the fairness of our 
system of justice.” (Since then, the court has 
also barred sex discrimination during jury 
selection, and the 9th Circuit has barred 
sexual orientation discrimination as well.) 
 
But Batson has a problem. After the 
defendant has claimed the prosecution struck 
a juror on account of his race, the prosecution 
can put forward a race-neutral explanation 
for its decision. Then the trial judge must 
decide whom to believe. Higher courts must 
show “great deference” for the trial judge’s 
decision on any Batson challenge. In 
practice, this rule means that prosecutors can 
usually toss out some pretext for striking a 
black juror. And if the trial judge buys it, the 
defendant must prove to an appeals court—
sometimes years later—that the prosecutor’s 
pretext masked a racist mindset. 
 
Because it’s so difficult to prove a state of 
mind, the Supreme Court has gradually 
allowed judges to look for clues that 
prosecutors struck jurors on account of their 
race. In one case out of Texas, the court cried 
foul when prosecutors used their peremptory 
strikes to exclude a stunning 91 percent of 
eligible black jurors at the trial of a black 
man. The court also noted some of the tricks 
the Texas prosecution used to keep blacks out 
of the jury. When a number of blacks sat 
toward the front of the room where the jurors 
were being chosen, for instance, the 
prosecutor “shuffled”—that is, rearranged 
where the candidates sat. Prosecutors usually 
evaluate potential jurors at the front of the 
jury panel first, so people toward the back are 
more likely to be dismissed. The prosecutor 
clearly shuffled the jury to move blacks from 
the front to the back. (Somehow, this is legal 
under Texas law.) 
 
Even worse, the prosecution attempted to 
dupe black jurors into disqualifying 
themselves. When querying prospective 
jurors about their opinion on capital 
punishment, the prosecution phrased the 
question graphically to 53 percent of blacks. 
(The so-called graphic script involved an 
explanation that, if sentenced to death, the 
defendant would be “taken to the death house 
and placed on a gurney and injected with a 
lethal substance until he is dead.”) To 94 
percent of whites, the prosecution said only 
that it was “actively seeking the death 
penalty.” Clearly, the prosecution hoped that 
blacks would reflect some ambivalence about 
capital punishment after hearing about the 
“death house”—at which point the 
prosecution could strike them for opposing 
the death penalty, not for being black. 
 
In 2008, faced with indisputable evidence of 
prosecutorial racism hidden behind a patina 
of neutrality, the court gave Batson an update 
in Snyder v. Louisiana. Writing for the court, 
Justice Samuel Alito (yes, that Alito) wrote 
that defendants need only prove a peremptory 
strike was motivated “in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent.” In other words, racism 
didn’t need to be the sole factor behind the 
strike—just a major part of it. And Alito 
cracked down on the obvious pretenses 
prosecutors employ, allowing judges to 
critically analyze “suspicious” justifications 
for striking black jurors. 
 250 
 
The justifications for striking every black 
juror from Foster’s trial aren’t merely 
suspicious. They’re laughable. For example, 
several black jurors were purportedly struck 
for having sons about Foster’s age, while 
white jurors with sons the same age were 
welcomed. And in light of the prosecution’s 
race-obsessed notes—which the trial court 
actually tried to keep secret—Foster should 
have a strong case at the Supreme Court. 
 
But it’s disturbing to think about how many 
other black men currently sit behind bars 
because they couldn’t find a paper trail to 
prove their prosecutor’s racism. All-white 
juries are significantly more likely to convict 
black defendants than a jury with even one 
black person. Prosecutors know that. They 
also know that as long as they keep their 
racist strikes subtle, they’re unlikely to be 
found out—and that even if they are, they 
probably won’t face punishment. Foster was 
convicted in 1987; it took him nearly three 
decades to bring his case to the Supreme 
Court. Racist prosecutors break the law, and 
the targets of their lawlessness face 
execution. That’s Georgia justice in action. 
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Dollar General Corporation v. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
13-1496 
Ruling Below: Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. Miss. 
2014) 
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), the Supreme Court held that generally 
"the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers 
of the tribe." The Court recognized as an exception to that rule that a "tribe may regulate, through 
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members."  
The Court subsequently recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001), that it has 
"never held that a tribal court had jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant" in any context, so 
that it remains an "open question" whether tribal courts may ever exercise civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 
(2008), this Court granted certiorari to decide whether Montana's undefined "other means" 
include adjudicating civil tort claims in tribal court. However, the Court resolved the case on 
other grounds.  
In this case, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that tribal courts do have that jurisdiction. 
Five judges dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. The case accordingly presents the 
issue the Court left open in Hicks and the Question the Court granted certiorari to decide in 
Plains Commerce. 
Question Presented: Whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort 
claims against nonmembers, including as a means of regulating the conduct of nonmembers who 
enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members? 
 
DOLGENCORP, INC. & Dollar General Corp., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
v. 
THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS; The Tribal Court of the Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians; Christopher Collins, in his official capacity; John Doe, a minor, 
by and through his parents and next friends John Doe Sr. and Jane Doe, 
Defendants – Appellees 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
Decided on October 3, 2013 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
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Before SMITH, HAYNES, and GRAVES, 
Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIUM: 
Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as 
a petition for panel rehearing, the petition for 
panel rehearing is DENIED. The court 
having been polled at the request of one of its 
members, and a majority of the judges who 
are in regular active service and not 
disqualified not having voted in favor, the 
petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. 
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, joined 
by JONES, CLEMENT, OWEN, and 
SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges, dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc: 
The opinion for the panel majority, although 
well crafted, takes Indian law well beyond 
anything supported by applicable precedent. 
I respectfully dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc. 
I have explained why the majority opinion is 
error. But error, indeed even grave error, as 
here, is ordinarily not enough to warrant en 
banc review. Such rehearing is justified if 
“the proceeding involves a question of 
exceptional importance.” That test is easily 
met here, because “[t]his ruling profoundly 
upsets the delicate balance that the Supreme 
Court has struck between Indian tribal 
governance . . . and American sovereignty.”  
Until now, no circuit court of appeals had 
upheld Indian-court jurisdiction, under the 
so-called “first exception” announced in 
Montana v. United States, over a tort claim 
against a non-Indian defendant. The holding 
is ambitious, to say the least, coming from a 
circuit that decides little Indian law. If this 
court is to work such a change in established 
precedent, it should be the careful work of the 
full court and not just a two judge majority. 
The panel majority emphasizes the 
reprehensible nature of the alleged act by 
opining that “[i]t is surely within the tribe’s 
regulatory authority to insist that a child 
working for a local business not be sexually 
assaulted by the employees.” Even this 
horrendous deed, however, does not 
implicate “tribal self-government” or the 
tribe’s ability “to control internal relations.” 
Moreover, no remedy is lost, because it is 
undisputed that the state courts of Mississippi 
are fully empowered to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s rights; this is mainly a turf battle 
over whether Indian sovereignty trumps the 
right of a non-Indian to have its case tried in 
an American forum. 
As I showed in dissent, all of the Supreme 
Court’s post-Montana decisions have tended 
to limit Indian-court jurisdiction in cases 
such as this. Nowhere has the Court endorsed 
no-holds-barred Indian jurisdiction requiring 
non-Indians to defend, on the basis of 
implicit consent by their presence and 
activity on a reservation, tort actions of 
whatever nature. The Supreme Court’s recent 
pronouncement is plain: Regulation of the 
affairs of non-Indians “must stem from the 
tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to set 
conditions on entry, preserve tribal self-
government, or control internal relations.”  
An act committed by a non-Indian on an 
Indian―even where the alleged facts are as 
distasteful as these―should not be a vehicle 
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for disrupting the carefully-drawn line 
separating tribal and U.S. sovereignty. I 
respectfully dissent. 
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“Supreme Court to Rule on Tribal Court Power Over Non-Indians” 
The Associated Press 
June 15, 2015 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear 
an appeal from Mississippi about the 
authority of tribal courts to try civil lawsuits 
involving non-Indians. 
The justices on Monday stepped into a 
lawsuit over allegations of sexual abuse of a 
teenager at a Dollar General store on the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
reservation. 
The family of the teen identified in court 
papers as John Doe filed a lawsuit in tribal 
court in 2005 seeking $2.5 million from the 
owners of the store and the man who 
allegedly molested him. The man has since 
been dismissed from the suit. The teen was 
taking part in a tribe-run internship program. 
The issue for the Supreme Court is whether 
the non-Indian owners of the store can be 
sued in tribal courts. 
Dollar General operates a store on trust land 
on the central Mississippi reservation. The 
tribe issued a license to the business. 
The company, as a non-Indian entity, refused 
to submit to the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 
Generally, tribes have no authority over 
nonmembers. 
In a 1981 case from Montana, the Supreme 
Court provided two exceptions - one for 
“consensual relationships” and another for 
activities that threaten the health or welfare 
of a tribe. 
The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
Orleans ruled in 2014 that the “consensual 
relationships” exception applied to Dollar 
General. 
“It is surely within the tribe’s regulatory 
authority to insist that a child working for a 
local business not be sexually assaulted by 
the employees of the business,” the 5th 
Circuit said. 
Government attorneys said the 5th Circuit’s 
decision should be upheld. 
“In the circumstances of this case, the tribal 
court has jurisdiction over the claims against 
petitioners because the allegedly tortious 
conduct occurred on tribal trust land and 
arose from a consensual relationship,” the 
government said in its brief. 
Dollar General attorneys argued in briefs that 
the government gave “no good answer” to the 
tribal jurisdiction issue being raised.  
“Permitting tribal court jurisdiction over tort 
claims against nonmembers constitutes ‘a 
serious step,’ given the Constitution’s 
premise of ‘original, and continuing, consent 
of the governed,’” the company’s attorneys 
said.
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“Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians” 
Harvard Law Review 
January 12, 2015 
 
As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian 
tribes retain all inherent sovereign powers 
“not withdrawn by treaty or [federal] statute, 
or by implication as a necessary result of their 
dependent status.” In Montana v. United 
States, the Supreme Court articulated the 
“general proposition” that Indian tribes’ 
exercise of civil regulatory authority over 
nonmembers is inconsistent with the tribes’ 
dependent status. Mindful of contrary 
precedent, the Court recognized two 
exceptions to the Montana rule: First, a tribe 
may regulate the “activities of nonmembers 
who enter consensual relationships with the 
tribe or its members.” Second, a tribe may 
regulate the conduct of non-Indians “when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”  
Recently, in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians, the Fifth Circuit 
explored the outer boundaries of the Montana 
rule by becoming the first federal court of 
appeals to endorse a tribal court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a nonmember tort defendant 
under Montana’s consensual-relationship 
exception. In the course of its analysis, the 
Fifth Circuit held that federal courts have no 
independent obligation to identify defects in 
tribal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Dolgencorp court’s characterization of 
limitations on tribal jurisdiction as waivable 
in federal court underscores the parallels 
between the rule of Montana and the 
constitutional doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction. 
Historically, tribes exercised broad sovereign 
authority within reservation boundaries, 
ordinarily limitable only by an explicit treaty 
provision or an act of Congress. That premise 
of territorial sovereignty was upended by the 
Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, which abrogated 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Explaining its decision in Oliphant, the Court 
reasoned that the ability to prosecute non-
Indians, like the ability to conduct foreign 
relations and alienate tribal lands, was “part 
of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly 
lost by virtue of their dependent status.” In 
1981, the Montana Court invoked Oliphant’s 
“implicit divestiture” rationale to hold that 
Indian tribes’ civil regulatory authority does 
not typically extend to nonmembers. In the 
thirty-four years since Montana was decided, 
the Supreme Court has steadily narrowed 
both exceptions to the rule while extending 
Montana’s scope to tribes’ taxation powers 
and adjudicative authority. 
Against this jurisdictional backdrop, 
Dolgencorp, Inc. (Dolgencorp), a Kentucky 
corporation, has for more than a decade 
operated a Dollar General store on tribal trust 
land located within the boundaries of the 
Choctaw Indian Reservation. The Dollar 
General store has operated pursuant to a lease 
agreement between Dolgencorp and the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (the 
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Tribe), as well as a business license issued by 
the Tribe. In 2003, Dale Townsend, the 
store’s non-Indian manager, volunteered 
Dolgencorp’s participation in the Youth 
Opportunity Program (YOP), a work-
experience program operated by the Tribe 
that seeks to place young tribal members in 
short-term, unpaid positions with local 
businesses in exchange for job training and 
mentorship. As part of the YOP, John Doe, a 
minor and member of the Tribe, was assigned 
to the Dollar General store for a temporary 
work placement. Doe subsequently reported 
Townsend to tribal authorities, alleging that 
Townsend had molested him while he 
worked in the store under Townsend’s 
supervision. 
In January 2005, Doe and his parents brought 
an action against Townsend and Dolgencorp 
in the Choctaw Tribal Court — the Tribe’s 
trial court — seeking to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages for 
Townsend’s allegedly tortious activity. The 
Does further asserted that Dolgencorp was 
independently liable for having negligently 
hired, trained, and supervised Townsend. 
Both Townsend and Dolgencorp moved to 
dismiss the Does’ action, arguing that the 
tribal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
to hear the case under the rule of Montana. In 
an oral ruling in July 2005, Judge Collins 
rejected the defendants’ arguments and held 
that the Choctaw Tribal Court could exercise 
adjudicative jurisdiction over the two 
nonmember defendants. Townsend and 
Dolgencorp appealed Judge Collins’s 
jurisdictional ruling to the Choctaw Supreme 
Court, which found jurisdiction to be proper 
under both exceptions to Montana. 
Having exhausted tribal court remedies, 
Dolgencorp and Townsend sought injunctive 
relief in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Mississippi, where 
they argued that the Choctaw Tribal Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
Does’ complaint. Judge Lee first rejected the 
Choctaw Supreme Court’s legal conclusion 
that Townsend’s and Dolgencorp’s allegedly 
tortious activity implicated tribal 
preservation or self-governance, finding such 
a conclusion to be “[m]anifestly . . . a far 
broader application of Montana’s second 
exception than is warranted.” After finding 
that tribal court jurisdiction over Townsend 
was no more justified by Montana’s first 
exception, Judge Lee enjoined the Does’ 
tribal court action against Townsend. Judge 
Lee subsequently granted the Tribe’s motion 
for summary judgment as to Dolgencorp. 
Judge Lee reasoned that by allowing Doe to 
work as an apprentice in its store, Dolgencorp 
had created a consensual relationship with 
the Tribe. As the Does’ tort claims were 
based on the conduct of a Dolgencorp 
employee during Doe’s tenure at the store, 
Judge Lee concluded that the Does’ action 
was sufficiently connected to that 
relationship to support tribal jurisdiction. 
Dolgencorp appealed Judge Lee’s decision to 
the Fifth Circuit, challenging on a variety of 
grounds Judge Lee’s legal conclusion that the 
Does and the Tribe had satisfied the 
requirements of Montana’s consensual-
relationship exception. 
 
A split Fifth Circuit panel affirmed in an 
opinion authored by Judge Graves. The 
majority first dismissed Dolgencorp’s 
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contention that there existed an insufficient 
nexus between the Does’ tort claims and 
Dolgencorp’s participation in the YOP. “In 
essence,” Judge Graves wrote, “a tribe that 
has agreed to place a minor tribe member as 
an unpaid intern in a business located on 
tribal land on a reservation is attempting to 
regulate the safety of the child’s workplace.” 
For the court, Dolgencorp’s decision to 
position an allegedly sexually dangerous 
individual in that workplace “ha[d] an 
obvious nexus to Dolgencorp’s participation 
in the YOP.” Next, the panel majority 
considered Dolgencorp’s argument that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle Co. “provided additional strictures to 
be utilized in the ‘consensual relationship’ 
analysis” by implying that tribes may 
regulate only those consensual relationships 
that “intrude on the internal relations of the 
tribe or threaten tribal self-rule.” The court 
declined to adopt Dolgencorp’s reading of 
Plains Commerce Bank, reasoning that the 
Plains Commerce Bank dictum merely 
restated the proposition that the ability to 
regulate consensual relationships on 
reservation land is “plainly central to the 
tribe’s power of self-government.” 
Lastly, despite having failed to raise the issue 
before Judge Lee, Dolgencorp argued on 
appeal that because its allegedly negligent 
hiring, training, and supervision of Townsend 
occurred off the Tribe’s reservation — and 
the Does’ tribal court complaint failed to 
allege otherwise — a decision affirming the 
Choctaw Tribal Court’s authority to 
adjudicate the controversy would allow the 
Tribe to regulate off-reservation conduct, 
presumably in violation of federal common 
law. Though the question of tribal court 
authority over a nonmember presented an 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Judge 
Graves disagreed that the new argument was 
properly before the court, writing, “Although 
it is true that defects in federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived in a federal 
case, a federal court has no independent 
obligation to ‘correct’ a tribal court’s lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction over another 
case.” Because Dolgencorp failed to 
demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances,” 
as required by Fifth Circuit precedent 
governing the consideration of forfeited 
arguments, the panel majority declined to 
consider Dolgencorp’s untimely argument 
and affirmed Judge Lee’s decision. 
Judge Smith dissented. For Judge Smith, 
Fifth Circuit precedent governing the 
applicability of Supreme Court dicta required 
the court to apply the Plains Commerce Bank 
Court’s statement that “Montana expressly 
limits its first exception to the ‘activities of 
nonmembers,’ allowing these to be regulated 
to the extent necessary ‘to protect tribal self-
government [and] to control internal 
relations.’” Even assuming that Montana’s 
first exception applied, Judge Smith found 
lacking the requisite nexus between 
Dolgencorp’s participation in the YOP and 
the Does’ tort claims and further posited that 
Montana may envisage only tribal regulatory, 
not adjudicative, jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. 
After writing that the manifest nature of the 
common law prohibition against tribal 
regulation of nonmembers’ off-reservation 
conduct constituted an “extraordinary 
circumstance” that warranted consideration 
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of Dolgencorp’s untimely jurisdictional 
argument on appeal, Judge Smith concluded 
by admonishing the majority for expanding 
tribal jurisdiction “far beyond the scope 
permitted by the Supreme Court or any other 
appellate authority.” 
The nature of the Supreme Court’s post-1978 
limitations on tribes’ adjudicative authority 
escaped characterization for some time. In 
Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court 
explained that such limitations “pertain[] to 
subject-matter, rather than merely personal, 
jurisdiction, since [they] turn[] upon whether 
the actions at issue in the litigation are 
regulable by the tribe.” That label has created 
the possibility that “courts will attach to tribal 
court jurisdiction all the incidents of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction,” including, as 
Dolgencorp argued, federal courts’ refusal to 
allow litigants to waive subject matter 
jurisdiction. The Dolgencorp court made an 
important contribution to federal Indian 
procedural law by concluding that federal 
courts have no independent obligation to 
ensure that tribal courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction in actions involving nonmember 
litigants. The Fifth Circuit’s procedural 
decision, which responds to competing 
tensions in federal Indian jurisdictional law, 
suggests that Hicks notwithstanding, the 
source of restrictions on tribal courts’ 
jurisdiction may render such limitations 
incompatible with some attributes of federal 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Well-established principles of Indian law 
recognize the tribes as “quasi-sovereign 
nations” whose broad authority over Indian 
lands is ordinarily limitable only by 
Congress. Since Chief Justice Marshall’s 
foundational opinion in Worcester v. 
Georgia, in which the Chief Justice 
recognized tribes’ legitimate claims to 
territory and self-government by 
emphasizing that tribal sovereignty over 
Indian lands had survived European 
conquest, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that tribal governments exercise the 
“inherent powers of a limited sovereignty 
which has never been extinguished.” For 
nearly one hundred fifty years, the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of tribal authority as 
sovereign authority limited judges’ ability to 
restrict the exercise of tribal powers, 
notwithstanding the implications for 
individual rights or state authority; in the 
years between Worcester and the Court’s 
1978 decision in Oliphant, the only two 
judicial limitations on tribal sovereignty were 
those abrogating the tribes’ authority to deal 
with foreign nations and extinguish land title. 
At odds with the traditional rule that federal 
courts must “tread lightly” to avoid 
infringing upon tribal sovereignty is the 
Supreme Court’s more recent willingness to 
restrain tribal authority to protect nonmember 
litigants. The Oliphant Court expressed 
concern over non-Indians’ unfamiliarity with 
tribal law and customs. The Court justified its 
decision in Duro v. Reina— which extended 
Oliphant’s rule to nonmember Indians— by 
invoking doubts about the independence and 
institutional capacity of tribal courts. In 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court balked at 
defining a rule that would force nonmember 
defendants to appear in “unfamiliar” tribal 
courts. In Plains Commerce Bank, Chief 
Justice Roberts explained that due process 
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considerations justify Montana’s general rule 
and first exception: 
Tribal regulation of the sale of fee 
land] runs the risk of subjecting 
nonmembers to tribal regulatory 
authority without commensurate 
consent. . . . The Bill of Rights does 
not apply to Indian tribes. . . . And 
nonmembers have no part in tribal 
government — they have no say in 
the laws and regulations that govern 
tribal territory. Consequently, those 
laws and regulations may be fairly 
imposed on nonmembers only if the 
nonmember has consented, either 
expressly or by his actions. 
The Supreme Court’s attention to fairness 
considerations in Oliphant, Duro, and Strate, 
as well as its emphasis on consent as a way to 
legitimate tribal civil authority in the face of 
those considerations in Plains Commerce 
Bank, has prompted some observers to draw 
parallels between the Supreme Court’s 
limitations on tribal courts’ jurisdiction and 
limitations on personal jurisdiction in state 
and federal courts. The Supreme Court’s 
desire to protect nonmember litigants from 
unfamiliar and inconvenient tribal forums 
bears striking similarity to the role of 
foreseeability and inconvenience to 
defendants in the personal jurisdiction 
context. The similarity is bolstered by the 
observation that the formulation of 
Montana’s two exceptions “mirror[s] the 
focus on the minimum contacts ‘bargain’ and 
on forum interests in personal jurisdiction.” 
Likewise, as the Ninth Circuit has 
recognized, Montana and Hicks coexist 
somewhat awkwardly in this respect, which 
is “evident in the fact that the Court has held 
that ‘consensual relationships’ may create 
jurisdiction, a holding inconsistent with 
federal subject matter jurisdiction, though 
perfectly consistent with principles of 
personal jurisdiction.” 
Dolgencorp underscores the reality that the 
dissimilarities between tribal and federal 
subject matter jurisdiction extend to the 
purposes that each serves. Limitations on the 
types of actions that may be adjudicated in 
federal court have a distinct origin from those 
that restrict the authority of tribal courts. The 
former enforce a nonwaivable structural 
division of public authority among the 
limited powers of the federal government and 
the residual authority of the states. As federal 
courts’ adjudication of disputes that fall 
outside of narrowly defined jurisdictional 
boundaries necessarily infringes upon state 
sovereignty, the Constitution obligates 
federal courts to enforce a “harsh rule” of 
dismissing actions improperly before them, 
notwithstanding parties’ failure to raise 
jurisdictional defects. Restrictions on tribal 
adjudicative authority, however, evolved out 
of the due process considerations expressed 
by the Court in Oliphant, Duro, Strate, and 
Plains Commerce Bank. The Fifth Circuit’s 
procedural decision accommodates those 
considerations by requiring federal courts to 
consider any colorable jurisdictional 
arguments raised by nonmember litigants. 
The approach simultaneously remains 
faithful to federal courts’ traditional 
reluctance to infringe upon tribal sovereignty 
by ordinarily declining to inquire into tribes’ 
exercise of sovereign powers where 
nonmember defendants forego a particular 
jurisdictional argument in the district court. 
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In the thirty-four years since Montana was 
decided, the Supreme Court has punctuated a 
“backdrop of previous case law affirming 
tribal powers” with a series of fact-specific 
holdings abrogating Indian tribes’ authority 
over nonmembers. The jurisdictional law that 
has resulted has left lower courts to confront 
legal questions that fall outside the bounds of 
the Court’s recent abrogations of tribal 
jurisdiction and onto an uncertain 
background rule affirming the importance of 
tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty. The Fifth 
Circuit’s adjudication of such a question in 
Dolgencorp emphasizes the difficulties with 
the Hicks Court’s label of “subject matter 
jurisdiction.” By disclaiming any 
independent obligation to verify that tribal 
courts have jurisdiction in actions involving 
nonmember litigants, the Dolgencorp court 
understood tribal subject matter jurisdiction 
as providing a right personal to the individual 
nonmember litigant. That right — like the 
right to contest a court’s personal 
jurisdiction— may be forfeited. Because the 
Fifth Circuit’s ruling resolves competing 
interests underlying federal Indian 
jurisdictional law as they relate to the 
question of jurisdictional waiver, Dolgencorp 
suggests that the distinctive nature of 
limitations on tribal courts’ jurisdiction may 
be incompatible with at least some attributes 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 
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“Dollar General Urges Justices to Tackle Tribal Jurisdictions” 
Law360 
Caroline Simson 
May 21, 2015 
 
Dollar General Corp. has told the U.S. 
Supreme Court it should take an opportunity 
to resolve the "festering question" of whether 
a tribe can subject a nonmember to litigation 
in a tribal court in the retailer's appeal of a 
sexual assault case involving a former store 
intern. 
The retailer's supplemental brief to the high 
court filed Tuesday said that its petition 
presents an important and recurring question 
that warrants review given the “stark 
disagreement” within the Fifth Circuit over 
the meaning of the Supreme Court's tribal 
jurisdiction precedents. 
Dollar General is seeking review of a Fifth 
Circuit decision affirming that a tribal court 
in Mississippi had the authority to decide the 
case of the intern, who is not named in court 
filings. The intern, a member of the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, sued 
Dollar General in Choctaw tribal court in 
2005, claiming he had been sexually 
assaulted by a store manager while 
participating in a tribal intern program. 
Rebutting an argument advanced by the U.S. 
government in an amicus brief this month, 
Dollar General said that permitting tribal 
court jurisdiction over tort claims against 
nonmembers would constitute "a serious 
step," given the U.S. Constitution's premise 
of "original and continuing, consent of the 
governed." 
Even though nonmembers may be present on 
reservation land, they have no part in tribal 
government and no say in tribal laws and 
regulations, the retailer said. 
"When, if ever, a citizen of a state and the 
United States may be subject to the 
jurisdiction 'of a third entity to be tried for 
conduct occurring wholly within the 
territorial borders of the nation and one of the 
states,' is a question that should be resolved 
by this court, not left to the lower federal and 
tribal courts," the company said. 
Although tribal courts generally lack the 
authority to decide cases involving 
nonmembers, a Mississippi federal court 
ruled that the so-called Montana exception 
applied in Dollar General's case, because the 
company's participation in the internship 
program established a consensual 
relationship between the store and the tribe. 
But the Montana exception is limited, and 
courts must take care not to risk subjecting 
nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority 
without commensurate consent, Dollar 
General argued in its Tuesday brief. 
The government claims that Dollar General 
consented to tribal tort jurisdiction by 
agreeing to do business on a reservation and 
by accepting the plaintiff intern. But the 
retailer said that argument would "swallow" 
the general rule that tribes have lost their right 
to govern nonmembers on their reservations. 
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The government also argued that the tribe had 
jurisdiction to regulate the allegedly tortious 
conduct even without the Montana exception 
because it took place on tribal trust land. 
But Dollar General responded that although 
the Ninth Circuit has adopted such reasoning, 
the Fifth Circuit did not embrace that 
"extreme" view of the case. 
"That the government, different courts, and 
individual judges can reach such radically 
different readings of this court’s tribal 
jurisdiction precedents shows just how 
uncertain this area of the law has become," 
the retailer said. 
The case against Dollar General dates back 
more than a decade. Dolgencorp LLC, which 
is also petitioning the Supreme Court, 
operates a Dollar General store on the 
Choctaw Indians' reservation. The store 
participated in the tribe's Youth Opportunity 
Program, which places young members in 
short-term jobs with local businesses. 
The tribe is seeking to keep in place the Fifth 
Circuit ruling that its tribal court had the 
authority to decide the sexual assault claims, 
telling the high court last year that the Fifth 
Circuit's decision is in line with Supreme 
Court precedent. 
Attorneys for the tribe were not immediately 
available for comment on Thursday. The 
government does not comment on pending 
litigation. 
In 2003 the plaintiff, who was a minor at the 
time, participated in the program and was 
assigned to the local Dollar General Store. 
The plaintiff claims that while he was 
working at the store he was sexually 
assaulted by store manager Dale Townsend. 
The intern sued Townsend, Dollar General 
and Dolgencorp in 2005 in the Choctaw tribal 
court. He claimed the store was liable for 
Townsend's conduct and sought at least $2.5 
million in damages. 
The companies have argued that the tribal 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case 
because Dollar General and Dolgencorp are 
not members of the tribe. After the Choctaw 
Tribal Court refused to dismiss the case, the 
companies unsuccessfully sought an 
injunction in Mississippi federal court. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Mississippi 
federal court’s ruling, prompting Dollar 
General's latest appeal to the high court. 
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“Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians” 
Cultural Survival 
Cass Madden 
June 23, 2015 
 
On June 15th, the Supreme Court of the 
United States agreed to hear the first Tribal 
jurisdiction case in 7 years. The Dollar 
General Corporation operates a store on land 
which belongs to the Mississippi Choctaw 
reservation; the Tribe issued a license to the 
store for use of the land. The manager of the 
store is accused of sexual assault of a minor 
working at the store through a youth training 
program. The parents of the minor brought 
charges against the corporation in Tribal 
court, suing Dollar General for $2.5 million 
in damages.  
Though the Tribal court ruled in favor of the 
minor and his family, the company refused to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the tribal court as 
a non-Indian entity. Previous cases have 
established that, generally, tribal authorities 
do not have jurisdiction over non-tribal 
members, but two important exceptions were 
established in the 1981 case Montana v. 
United States: tribal authorities have 
jurisdiction over non-tribal members who 
have entered into consensual relationships 
with Tribal members and have jurisdiction in 
regards to activities that threaten the political 
integrity, economic security, or health and 
well-being of the tribe.  
Dollar General appealed the case in the 5th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the 
consensual relationship exception exists in 
this case, because the minor and the manager 
had willingly and knowingly entered into a 
professional relationship and the Tribe has 
reasonable authority to prosecute the sexual 
assault of one of its members. Dollar General 
filed a petition with the Supreme Court, 
expressing that the tribal jurisdiction question 
had not been effectively resolved in the case. 
The case is up for argument in the current 
court term. 
The Supreme Court summarizes the issue 
being discussed in the case as “[w]hether 
Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to 
adjudicate civil tort claims against 
nonmembers, including as a means of 
regulating the conduct of nonmembers who 
enter into consensual relationships with a 
tribe or its members.” Aside from the obvious 
fact that the case impacts tribes, the case is 
being anxiously watched by tribal authorities 
across the country because tribal interests 
have had such a poor record in recent court 
cases—since 2005, tribal interests have won 
only 2 cases and lost 9. Indeed, there has been 
a concerted effort on the part of tribes to keep 
cases out of a supreme court obviously 
unsympathetic to Indian issues.  
In 2001, the Tribal Supreme Court Project 
was created in an attempt to ensure better 
representation and advocacy of indigenous 
issues in the US Supreme Court—the 
outcome of the current case may be an 
indicator of the progress of that work. The 
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Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians filed an 
opposition brief urging the Supreme Court 
not to hear the case, heavily citing both the 
decision in Montana v United States and the 
decisions of the lower courts in the 
intervening years to argue that this particular 
case does not constitute an exception to the 
rules for tribal jurisdiction laid out in the 
1981 case.  
The Court ultimately accepted the petition of 
the Dollar General Corporation, but the Tribe 
introduces several key points about the 
limited jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in 
deciding tribal issues (this bridges on 
legislation, which is the purview of congress) 
and the lack of abuses present in the tribal 
justice system which are sure to be key points 
in the arguments and deliberation of the case.   
The continued existence of tribes is 
dependent on tribal sovereignty and tribal 
jurisdiction, which previous court decisions 
have severely limited; if the court rules in 
favor of Dollar General, the already limited 
reach of tribal jurisdiction will be further 
reduced. 
 
 
